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FACING A TIME OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION-THE
KEPONE INCIDENT AND A REVIEW OF FIRST
PRINCIPLES
Zygmunt J.B. Plater*
The Kepone contamination episode of 1966-75 was a mile-
stone that focused an entire nation's attention on environmental
hazards and our need to do better in recognizing and avoiding
them. We have learned a great deal from that unfortunate
story.1 The evolution of American environmental law since the
Kepone debacle has repeatedly used the incident as a touch-
stone in identifying environmental pollution's causes, effects,
and potential solutions.2
Twenty years have passed, and today we seem to be at an-
other milestone. Quite suddenly, our national political process is
being positioned to halt and reconsider what we as a society
have accomplished in environmental protection over the past
several decades. The same market forces that necessitated the
development of environmental law in the first place-now
marching behind a facade of populism-are initiating a
broadranging and quite radical demolition of the environmental
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I offer my congratulations and
appreciation to the University of Richmond Law School and this law review for pre-
paring what was a useful and extremely enjoyable symposium. My thanks, for data
on fisheries, to my colleagues Alison Rieser, Eleanor Dorsey, and Peter Shelley.
1. See generally Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672
(1992), affd without opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995) (chronicling the Kepone sto-
ry); ZYGMUJNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY. NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 42-48, 336-42 (1992) [hereinafter NLS]; William Goldfarb, Kepone: A
Case Study, 8 ENvTL. L. 645 (1978); Christopher D. Stone, A Slap on the Wrist for
the Kepone Mob, reprinted in CORPORATE VIOLENCE 121 (Stuart L. Hills ed., 1977);
Morton Mintz & Daniel Klaidman, Creative Settlement or Improper Deal?, LEGAL
TIMES, May 11, 1992, at 1.
2. For examples of how the Kepone incident has been invoked as a touchstone,
with repeated legislative uses of the Kepone narrative in the formation of environ-
mental protection policy and regulation, see William Goldfarb, Changes in the Clean
Water Act Since Kepone: Would They Have Made a Difference?, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
603 (1995).
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protections built up over that time. The terms of the current
debate are so broad and indiscriminate that it seems appropri-
ate to use the Kepone story, with its repercussions and echoes,
to go back to first principles in order to understand the present,
and help chart a course for the future.3
This essay offers four propositions, about two things that
have changed, and two things that have not, in the years since
Kepone, taking account of where we are, and seeking some
points of consensus. Environmental law is always controversial,
because from the very beginning environmental issues have
been regarded as inherently iconoclastic, and yet there may be
some areas of consensus about public policy and environmental
law that have evolved over these past decades.
Here are the propositions:
- First, entrepreneurial human nature inevitably necessitates
environmental law, and powerfully resists it. Human nature
has not suddenly changed in the past twenty years, and that
means that the fundamental behavioral logic that produced the
Kepone crisis still must be acknowledged as a chronic inherent
limitation of human economic systems, requiring the counterbal-
ancing application of civic values. Some form of regulation im-
porting societal interests and values into the marketplace is
inevitably necessary, but it is atavistically resisted by the hu-
man nature engine that drives economic enterprise.
• Second, environmental science, public policy consensus, and
environmental law have changed dramatically since the 1970s,
growing in volume and sophistication, and representing an
intricately-evolved system of human knowledge and technology
3. No single conference can canvass the full range of issues that are shaping
environmental law, or even all of the repercussions of the Kepone event. The field
sprawls far too wide for that. As my colleagues and I concluded when we decided to
prepare a coursebook approaching environmental law from the legal process perspec-
tive, it is very difficult to discern any subject area other than environmental law that
extends so broadly throughout the structures of modem legal systemsI-local, state,
federal, and international; civil, criminal, and administrative; based on common law,
statutes, and regulations; ranging from Bentham's utilitarianism to Kantian norms;
from empiricism to metaphysics. A vehicle this wideranging cannot be sandwiched
into one essay without becoming a superficial catalogue, so this piece will treat a few
points worthy of note.
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that can surely be improved, but cannot reasonably be un-
learned or peremptorily rejected.
- Third, the societal importance of active citizen engagement
in governance and the legal system has not changed. As Ameri-
cans, we do not believe that government can do it all, and leav-
ing the implementation of national policies up to public and
private executives and bureaucracies does not work very well in
this rambunctious country. Nor is the importance of active
citizen pluralism likely to diminish.
0 Fourth, here in 1995 the momentum of environmental
policymaking is facing fundamental challenge. The long-antici-
pated corporate counter-revolution has arrived. On its terms
hardly a "conservative" or "populist" reform movement, the
agenda represents a continuation of the human logic of market
forces, passing costs on to others or to the future and power-
fully resisting social accountability and the imposition of civic
restraints. The New Unlearning is forcing a review of basic
principles, and a process of consolidation, improvement, and
defense of what has been accomplished.
This essay reviews these propositions with reference to the
Kepone case and to some other past and ongoing environmental
controversies that illustrate them.
I. RONALD COASE & RACHEL CARSON: EXTERNALIZATION,
CUMULATIVE CONSEQUENCES, AND REGULATION
A. The Inexorable Tendency to Externalize, and the Inevitability
of Cumulative Consequences
Our human nature has not changed over the past twenty
years, and that means that the fundamental behavioral logic
that produced the Kepone crisis still dominates the way market
forces act, and still requires a civic system that will induce the
players to take account of broader societal interests.
The basic logic remains as Ronald Coase and Rachel Carson
discerned it in the 1960s, and as the Kepone case revealed it in
the 1970s: humans tend to make decisions in relatively short-
term horizons, in insulated, self-referential terms. We tend to
try to maximize our personal pleasures and profits, we strenu-
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ously avoid and ignore burdensome liabilities if we can, and we
may hope or pretend that negative consequences will disappear
and not accumulate to the detriment of others. Coase, the econ-
omist, showed us how this process of cost externalization is a
completely logical and powerful tendency in individualized hu-
man behavior.' When we are involved in a productive activity
(or any activity, for that matter, the economists say), we reso-
lutely display an inclination to pass wide the costs and to hold
close the profits and subsidies. It is a fundamentally rational
strategy in individual terms. As a consequence, there is a pow-
erful inherent pressure within corporate management, and
market forces generally, to externalize pollution and other so-
cial costs into the environment.
Rachel Carson showed us, however, that this tendency is
dominated by short-term individualized thinking and can be
quite dysfunctional in overall terms. Humans, corporations, and
disparate segments of the environment are not dissociated indi-
vidual islands floating in a vacuum; they live in a web of direct
and indirect interconnections. Externalities go somewhere and
tend to have serious accumulated consequences that can end up
dwarfing the short term actions that spawned them.5 Then and
now, however, humans and their marketplace do not voluntarily
rush to take into account the negative effects of what they do,
so law is necessary and inevitable.
Viewed in these terms, the Kepone case offers a classic exam-
ple of the powerful tendency of corporate managers operating
under market forces to externalize pollution unless there is a
credible threat of external accounting and liability.
To understand the phenomenon, we must begin with the
perspective of the human decision makers, the corporate execu-
tives who brought the Kepone controversy into being. Did the
Kepone debacle arise out of managerial ignorance? The answer
appears to be that it did not. What did Allied's managers know
about Kepone? They knew from the beginning that Kepone was
very effective in killing certain bugs, and that there were cus-
tomers in the marketplace who would buy it. They also knew,
however, how toxic the Kepone chemical was to humans and
4. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
5. See Rachel Carson, SILENT SPRING (1962).
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other higher lifeforms beyond insects.6 The toxicity tests on
laboratory animals, showing serious long-term neurotoxic ef-
fects, had been so alarming that Allied withdrew its application
for any use of the pesticide in the United States (where health
standards are generally higher than in most other countries).'
The factual record of the Kepone saga is complex and volumi-
nous,8 but let us initially consider just one particular exam-
ple-the continuing liquid discharges of untreated Kepone
wastes into the environment from 1966, when production began,
to 1975 when it was finally closed down.9
Allied's managers must have known intellectually that
Kepone's liquid wastes were toxic, but this reality could be
obscured from acknowledgment by a veil of internal expediency.
At that time in the 1970s, environmental consciousness had not
generally arrived. Wastes were hardly considered, and they
were taken for granted as the trivial and inevitable byproducts
of the manufacture of useful goods. To the extent that Allied's
managers might have considered undertaking the process of
neutralizing wastes and disposing of them benignly, they would
surely have recognized it as potentially a very expensive propo-
sition. Moreover, if they spoke of it amongst themselves, the
corporate managers could well have thought, "but everybody
does it," which meant that any company that went out of its
way to dispose of wastes conscientiously would take on those
heavy expenses only to reap a competitive disadvantage. So
what did the executives decide? From the moment Allied began
production in 1966 until 1974, the Semi-Works summarily
6. The manuals developed for use in the Semi-Works evidence a substantial
knowledge of the dangers of contact with human skin, cuticle, lungs, and other or-
gans.
7. It appears that some Kepone ultimately was sold for use in ant traps in the
United States, though apparently without registration. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Com-
missioner 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672, 2672 (1992), affd without opinion, 54 F.3d 767
(1995).
8. The proceedings of the first day of this symposium have provided a significant
addition to the Kepone record, and this essay can consider only a fraction of the
actions and consequences. Notably outside the scope of discussion here is the entire
question of "externalizing" negative accounting by marketing the toxic product only in
underdeveloped consumer nations.
9. There were also substantial amounts of THEIC and TEIC dumped along with
the Kepone waste, although compared to Kepone these substances are not chemically
active.
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dumped these Kepone wastes without treatment, discharging
some into the disposal lagoons behind the Semi-Works and
some through a pipe into Gravelly Run. From there the wastes
drained into the James River and downstream a hundred miles
to the Chesapeake Bay, where they were taken up into the
ecosystem, from plankton, to bluefish, to humans. But out of
sight was out of mind. Like industrial managers everywhere, as
Coase's logic explains, Allied's officials were naturally inclined
toward externalizing the costs of production as much as they
could.' °
1. The External Veil of Diffusion: Spreading Costs Broadly in a
Natural System
Needless to say, discharging pollution into the environment
serves the practical tactic of widespread diffusion, so that
externalized pollutants are harder to see: they are less concen-
trated, are commingled with other discharges, and are harder
to trace back to their sources. If the workers at Kepone had not
exhibited such vivid neurological consequences, it is indeed
possible that the Kepone pollution of the Chesapeake Bay
would never have been tested and would have gone undiscov-
ered. One of the fundamental problems of environmental degra-
dation is that the costs, though often many times greater than
the profits reaped by the actors, are spread so widely and indi-
rectly that they are not readily tangible." In addition, many
environmental externalities are "paid" by nonhuman species
destroyed or degraded by the effects of externalized human
actions; if no human economic interest is directly linked to
10. Coase's further arguments, that the marketplace would broker these costs so
that it did not matter who started out with rights, depended, as is usual in economic
theory, on such an array of premises, including perfect knowledge of what was going
on and zero transaction costs, that Coase's theories have been far more persuasive for
their underlying explanation of entrepreneurial behavior than for their market-trust-
ing economic prescriptions for solutions.
11. Widespread diffusion can indeed lessen environmental effects. One of the ra-
tionales regularly espoused by industrial polluters is that 'The solution to pollution is
dilution," implying that externalization into the environment is as benign a strategy
as it is cheap. In fact, however, as the Kepone case showed, many pollutants do not
thin out evenly through the environment, but rather collect in nodes, "hot spots," and
localized sites like bottom sediments or fish livers, where their effects are reconcen-
trated rather than dispersed.
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them, they may be for all intents and purposes invisible. But as
Rachel Carson argued, these things do have consequences that
accumulate as immutably as natural laws, and they tend even-
tually to become inescapably evident.
From 1960 to 1970, Allied's executives had few practical
statutory concerns to induce them to take account of these
discharges. As in most states, Virginia's regulation was ex-
tremely tolerant of pollution sources that were tied to major
economic activities, and the federal government's water pollu-
tion statutes were not enforced.' Note also that absent an ac-
tively enforced regulatory system, the common law clearly did
not then have enough credibility to require the executives mak-
ing such decisions to think twice about dumping into Gravelly
Run.
In 1970, however, the federal government resurrected the
Refuse Act's permitting program, and Allied learned that it was
supposed to tell the government what it was dumping and to
obtain a permit. If Allied's executives revealed that they were
dumping a toxic chemical into the James River, they faced
unpredictable regulatory repercussions; so the decision was
made to list the Semi-Works discharge as an unidentified "tem-
porary discharge," which did not come under the RAP Pro-
gram.13
In 1972, the RAP Federal Program was replaced by the
Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit program, under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Now Allied was
directly requested to disclose the nature, volume, and strength
of all their discharges from the Semi-Works. The Allied manag-
ers considered three options: to ignore the reporting require-
ments of the law and do nothing, hoping that EPA would not
find out about it; to divert the Semi-Works effluent into another
legal outfall pipe for which a permit had been obtained; or to
try to improve the quality of the discharges while telling EPA
12. The Refuse Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988), had been on the books
since 1899, but was not yet recognized and enforced as a national pollution control
provision. See NLS supra note 1, at 322-27. The'Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
then on the books, was a feeble study-discuss-and-scold act.
13. See Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 648.
1995] 663
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
as little as possible about what they were doing. It is notewor-
thy that each of the options that the company considered was
illegal. The company ultimately decided to follow the first strat-
egy, so that up until the time that it transferred its Kepone
operations to Life Sciences Products (LSP),'4 the managers
had, despite the requirements of two federal laws, matter-of-
factly decided to continue dumping its liquid effluents into
Gravelly Run without any treatment whatsoever, from which it
went into the waters and the bottom sediments of the James
River and the Chesapeake Bay, into the food chain, into the
fatty tissues of fish and the humans who ate them.
The same externalizing tendency was evident beginning in
1974 in the relationship between Allied and LSP, with its in-
creased pollution of the workplace, air, and water resources.
Indeed, LSP was Allied's domestic maquiladora-an early
example of what, in the last dozen years, has become a trend of
American corporations to shift their dirtiest operations to a
satellite corporate shell that can be less attentive to protective
rules, another form of structural externalization. The satellite
corporation is not an autonomous actor. It is controlled by the
parent corporation and, in effect, merely provides an external
processing service, like a grist mill of old.15 In the classic mill-
ing arrangement, a mill receives a raw material like grain for
processing, it grinds the grain, and then returns the processed
product for a service fee. Under the "tolling" agreement with
LSP, Allied supplied all the raw materials for Kepone produc-
tion, retained the title to them throughout the process, deter-
mined the monthly production rate of Kepone, and received the
pesticide as packed by LSP into Allied containers, to be trans-
ported to the wharves in Allied trucks. Allied paid for all of
LSP's capital expenditures, including, it appears, underwriting
LSP's purchase of land and its ex-gas station production build-
14. The tolling contract was executed in late 1973, and production began in
March 1974. Given the company's product, as well as its unintended consequences,
the name choice for the company is another example of self-referential corporate iro-
ny, like "Forever Wild Development Co.," a real estate venture within New York's
Adirondack Park boundaries, and the "Save Our Cumberland Mountains Stripmine
Co." in Tennessee.
15. In fact the word "maquila" in Spanish is a word for "mill."
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ing, and Allied paid all of LSP's taxes, except corporate income
taxes. 6
The results of LSP's operations were sad. The liquid dis-
charges into the James continued, and air pollution from
Kepone dust became a serious hazard in and outside the LSP
plant.' The ambient pollution at LSP undoubtedly occurred on
a far worse scale than at the Semi-Works.
The most horrific manifestation of the pollution was the
physical poisoning of workers at the site. Conditions within the
LSP workplace "might have shocked Charles Dickens," Kepone
dust was "flying through the air... saturating the workers'
clothing, getting... into sandwiches they munched.... "
workers were "virtually swimming in the stuff." Workers were
not required to wear protective equipment, even when it was
available, and no warning signs were posted. Kepone is a chlo-
rinated hydrocarbon that can be absorbed through the skin as
well as breathed in or swallowed. As it accumulates in the body
it generates neurological symptoms, including eye tremors, hand
tremors, and serious liver dysfunction. Seventy percent of the
workers had "the shakes," a neurological condition involving
tremors. In addition to being identified as a carcinogen, Kepone
apparently has effects on the reproductive system as well. Some
workers showed dramatically lowered sperm counts and low
sperm motility.'"
16. See Stone, supra note 1, at 122 (noting that a Richmond bank was persuaded
to finance LSP's startup despite the fact that Hundtofte and Moore, its putative own-
ers, had put up only a thousand or less of their own money); see also Goldfarb, supra
note 1, at 650.
17. Kepone dust blew around the LSP plant and into the air, crossing the street
to the west onto the school grounds, and blowing further. In fact, Kepone dust was
carried by the winds in a plume that carried detectable amounts of Kepone as far as
Richmond. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2674 (1992).
Hundtofte and Moore had written the health manual used at Allied, where workplace
conditions were far better than those at LSP, but a decision was apparently made
that the LSP operation could not or would not absorb the costs of safe workplace
conditions.
18. JOSEPH L. BODARACCO, HARVARD BusINESS SCHOOL, ALLIED CHEMICAL CORPO-
RATION 5 (1979). Interestingly, the HBS case study essentially ignores the role of
Allied managers in the Kepone affair, treating contamination as the result of isolated
renegade acts of the Life Sciences company, which was identified only as a small
Allied "supplier," thereby finessing the point that the tolling contract was a carefully-
considered corporate externalization by Allied itself.
19. Telephone Interview with Edward Taylor, Esquire, Plaintiffs' Attorney in the
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It seems quite clear that Allied's managers knew about LSP's
casual approach to pollution control from the moment of execu-
tion of the tolling contract. LSP agreed to make Kepone at 54
cents a pound-later reduced to 32-38 cents a pound in consid-
eration of Allied's substantial support of LSP's production pro-
cess. Outside competitors' bids had proposed to charge Allied as
much as $3.00 a pound to make Kepone, with an expense of 30
cents a pound for waste disposal costs alone. After production
began, Allied officials regularly toured the LSP plant ° and
monitored LSP's operations. From LSP's inception, and from its
sporadic negotiations on LSP's behalf with the Hopewell sewer
department and the Commonwealth of Virginia, Allied undoubt-
edly understood LSP's character-a bare bones processing oper-
ation demonstrating minimal concern for pollution discharges.
Given the basic logic toward cost externalization, and the
status of LSP as a tolling maquiladora for which a primary
raison d'etre was to avoid liability, it is hardly surprising that
no internal corporate initiatives occurred within Allied to pre-
vent the Kepone discharges. Like the maquiladoras in Mexico,
LSP was induced by its own officers and by its supervisory
corporate managers at Allied to produce its low budget product
at high environmental cost.
When finally the whistle was blown on Kepone, it was not by
an insider within the corporation, not by a government official,
and not even by a worker, but by an outsider, Doctor Chou,
who persistently followed up on the health effects to his pa-
tients who worked at LSP. He sent successive blood samples to
the Center for Disease Control, which revealed some of the
highest levels of Kepone thought possible to accumulate in the
human bloodstream.2 ' Only after Dr. Chou's dramatic iden-
tification of the Kepone poisoning did the governmental units
move to shut down the discharges and (shortly thereafter, when
follow-up tests were made downstream to Chesapeake Bay),
shut down fishing in the James and portions of the Bay.
I talked with several people in Hopewell who said in heart-
felt terms that they wish people would just forget about the
Kepone Incident. (Feb. 14, 1995).
20. Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 650.
21 Id. at 652.
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Kepone story, which for years has stigmatized their city. One
person said "it could have happened anywhere." Of course a
poisoning of this scope and notoriety could not have happened
anywhere; the Kepone pollution's scope and toxicity are not
generally prevalent conditions. But it could have happened in a
number of other places-in fact it has, including Rocky Flats,
Times Beach, Galveston Ship Channel, and others, and also
almost certainly in some places that have not yet been re-
vealed-but the Kepone incident became dramatically visible as
a poisoning, and had a magnitude of scope that made it easier
to raise the broader questions and to teach the broader lessons.
And why did the Kepone story receive such particular notori-
ety? The Kepone story's notoriety occurred not so much because
it was unique as because it was vivid. The poisoning of the LSP
plant's workers-the majority of whom required hospital treat-
ment-was dramatic, as was the starkness of the corporate
record of persistent dumping of known toxins into the air and
water in defiance of federal and state laws.
Kepone also gained special prominence from the richness of
the impacted downstream resources, the James River estuary
and Chesapeake Bay. These were not just intangible aesthetic
losses, but the wiping out, for thirteen years, of commercial
fisheries in a vast public resource.22 As Judge Merhige said in
the Pruitt case, the "costs were borne most directly by the wild-
life of the Chesapeake Bay,"' but in this case that ecosystem
was also visibly connected to a major economic activity. Fur-
thermore, the Kepone story hit at a media moment when there
were no other major competing stories, so a horde of reporters
was dispatched to Hopewell to make this incident into a highly
photogenic chronicle of a public disaster.
In more basic terms, although it may well be that the
Kepone case on its particular facts could not have happened in
many places, the Hopewell citizen was right that this kind of
polluting behavior could have happened almost anywhere. The
human players in the Allied-LSP Kepone drama were motivated
by an inherent tendency to externalize as Ronald Coase had
22. Rex Springston, Do Politicians Pose Peril to Environment? Pendulum Swings
Back, Symposium Crowd Told, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 1995, at B1.
23. Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981).
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described it in 1960.24 My point is not to say that the people
involved in the Allied-LSP corporate decisions were bad people;
precisely the opposite. They, like individual actors throughout
the society, and in a number of other dramatic environmental
controversies, were locked into a set of internal inclinations
that pressured them forcefully to externalize. The inherent
pressure of these market forces ultimately requires some exter-
nal imposition of public values in order to achieve a balance.
We need our good fences to make good neighbors.
2. The Internal Veil of Operational Expediency
Why didn't the managers take account of the obvious hazards
of the releases of Kepone toxics into the workplace and the
external environment? One answer is that ignoring such ques-
tions produces useful functional effects. Anyone who has worked
in a business knows that there are strong inherent pressures
within economic enterprises to maximize the positive and mini-
mize the negative.25 The natural internal pressures of a stress-
ful production-oriented society mean that factories all over the
country at that time were inclined to behave the same way as
LSP and Allied had. In part it was because industrial managers
were still not sensitive to environmental pollution as a legal
problem. Many still thought of it as a fad that would quickly
disappear." In social terms, environmental pollution was not
recognized as a public danger either; it's the way we always
had produced goods. But the practical downside threat of liabili-
ty was negligible as well, and that had direct consequences.
Regulation was primitive, and the common law had not yet
been recognized and developed to take account of environmental
24. That is, the natural course of externalizing behavior resulted in cumulative
pollution discharges into the commons, the results of which Rachel Carson had ob-
served in her work at the same time.
25. The phenomenon of veiling pollution discharges is both internal and external,
involving both deception and self-deception, as they are parsed in Professor Rodgers'
thoughtful piece, Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evaluating Long-Term Environ-
mental Settlements, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 567 (1995).
26. As an example of the fad image of the field, to be an environmental law
teacher in the mid 1970s was no easy niche. Some professors had to take on a heavy
roster of traditional megalithic courses in order to be allowed the luxury of teaching
the fad environmental course, short-lived and irrelevant to real legal practice as it
was deemed to be.
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harms, so that there were no credible perceived compulsions to
take account of the consequences of the discharges. Even if
altruism had raised its head within in the enterprise (a tenden-
cy which historically has not provided notable restraint),
Allied's managers could assume that their competitors were
going to continue discharging as much as they could, so they
themselves would have to follow suit in order to stay even."
In that setting, it is understandable that managers will tend,
as much as they can, to avoid paying the profitless expendi-
tures of pollution control, and will discount in their personal
calculus the speculative long term costs, like the possibility or
the probability of being caught, if ever, and the likelihood that
substantial fines or civil awards might ultimately be levied
against their companies.'
And what of the industrial workers, who must have had
some idea that their health was being affected by the working
conditions at LSP? Again there is an instinct to stay with a job
and not question conditions that are producing wages, at least
until the point where a vivid symptom is definitively revealed.
In some industries, unions have been able to operate as the
whistleblowing defenders of workers' health, but LSP was not
unionized. As another common manifestation of this veil of
internal expediency, it may well be that there was amongst the
workers an unspoken (or even unconscious) group collusion in
not asking the frightening questions that might reveal distress-
ing facts that would put good wages at risk. So it was Dr.
Chou, the outsider from Taiwan, who pulled the veil off the
workers' eyes, and the picture thereby revealed made everyone
ask, "how could this be?"
3. Cumulative Externalizations-Some Comparisons
In addition to observing the corporate calculus which pro-
duced the Kepone incident, which can represent here a generic
27. Within the American managerial force, moreover, we have created an execu-
tive reward structure which tends to measure success in terms of quarterly perfor-
mance, which often means executives are not rewarded for research and development
expenses or reinvestment, a tendency not shared with Japanese corporations, for
instance, and one that bodes ill for long term competitiveness.
28. See Stone, supra note 1.
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pollution setting leading directly into modern command-and-con-
trol regulatory systems, let us consider two other stories-the
Alaska oil spill as a case study in multicorporate management
which can also represent large public works projects, and the
crash of the North Atlantic ground fisheries, a paradigm case of
externalizations in a renewable sustainable resource setting.
a. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Given the backdrop of today's highly-charged political de-
bates, where perception tends to be everything and media cov-
erage makes a volatile difference in the rapid spurts of legis-
lative process, we can ask ourselves in each environmental
setting how easy it is to see the externalizing cause and effect.
The more difficult it is to see both cause and effect, the less
likely it is that public scrutiny and regulation will be brought
to bear effectively. As we have noted, for example, the Kepone
poisoning became visible, and directly attributable to the corpo-
rate managers who had created it, because of a series of coinci-
dences-the vividness of the workplace poisoning revealed by
Dr. Chou and the impact of the Chesapeake Bay fishing clo-
sures.
The wreck of the Exxon Valdez, the largest oil spill in U.S.
waters, also became dramatically and inescapably visible to the
eyes of regulators and the world because of the photogenicity of
its massive pods of floating oil, struggling oiled birds and sea
mammals on a previously wild and beautiful coast.29
On Thursday night, March 23, 1989, shortly after nine
o'clock, the M/V Exxon Valdez cast off from the oil loading ter-
minal near the little port town of Valdez, Alaska, which was
chiselled into a rocky mountainside at the inland end of the
Valdez fjord where the Trans-Alaska Pipeline terminates. The
single-hulled supertanker carried 53 million gallons of Alaska
crude for the trip to the refinery at Long Beach, California.
29. The author was coordinator of the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission's
legal research task force, examining how such a disaster happened and how a repeat
occurrence could be avoided. Opinions and conclusions expressed here are private, and
not the statements of the Commission. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, SPILL: THE
WRECK OF THE EXXON VALDEZ (1990) [hereinafter OIL SPILL COMMISSION].
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Two hours later, having sailed through the ford, it gathered
speed to about 12 knots and headed out through Prince William
Sound, an arm of the Gulf of Alaska, one of the world's richest
fishing grounds. (It was the beginning of the spring spawning
season for birds, marine mammals, and the millions of fish that
returned to these waters annually to reproduce.) There were
iceberg warnings that night; the Sound was littered with huge
chunks of floating ice calved off the Columbia Glacier on the
Sound's northeast flank. At 11:25 p.m., Captain Hazelwood
radioed the Coast Guard his intention 0 to turn from the right
hand outbound lane into the incoming lane in order to avoid
ice, and soon thereafter went below to his cabin.
Left on the bridge was Third Mate Gregory Cousins. Accord-
ing to regulations, there should have been at least two officers
and a lookout, but Cousins was at the helm alone because the
others were exhausted. (He himself had had little sleep over
the past twenty-four hours because he had had to supervise the
loading of the ship.) The ship was put on autopilot and plowed
along through the dark.
A half hour later, at four minutes before midnight, Lookout
Jones sleepily came up to the bridge, and noticed that a red
navigation light that should have been on the left was on the
right. She told Cousins, who began trying to turn, initially
forgetting that the ship was still on autopilot. By the time the
order for "hard right rudder" was given, it was physically im-
possible for the tanker to turn enough to miss the underwater
granite spines of Bligh Reef half a mile away. Five minutes
later the ship shuddered three times and came to a stop atop
the rocks. In the next forty-eight hours at least eleven million
gallons of crude poured out into the Sound, ultimately to be
caught up by wind and currents and pushed inexorably west-
ward over twelve hundred miles of coastline, causing massive
destruction of the natural systems it touched. The results of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill were easy for the public and political
process to see, and hard for the industry to hide."'
30. The captain did not have to receive permission to use the inbound lane. Be-
cause of industry requests, the approach lanes had not been designated as manda-
tory, but only voluntary.
31. That understandably did not stop Exxon and the Alyeska consortium from
trying to limit the access of reporters to oil spill disaster sites.
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But far more difficult to see was why it had occurred. From
the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission's study of the disas-
ter, it became clear that the Exxon Valdez disaster was not the
quirk result of a captain with a drinking problem, but a com-
pletely foreseeable result of a series of industry decisions
(backed by governmental subventions). Deeply rooted compla-
cency in both the private and the public bureaucracies, the
Commission said, lay at the heart of why the oil spill disaster
had occurred. 2 In spite of desperate efforts by local citizens,
particularly the commercial fishermen of Prince William Sound,
to warn of the serious risks being taken by the Alyeska consor-
tium," corporate managers and governmental officials alike
continued to minimize the need for serious attention to safety
redundancy, spill prevention, and emergency response prepara-
tions.
Following the logic of the marketplace, the companies that
made up the Alyeska consortium from the beginning in 1976
had been shaving costs throughout the TAPS operation from
the oil fields of Prudhoe Bay along 800 miles of pipeline to the
terminal at Valdez and in their shipping operations, in a pro-
cess that unfortunately made the Exxon Valdez spill predict-
able. Supertankers of the Exxon Valdez class, for example,
originally carried a complement of thirty-six seamen. Over the
years, as the companies within the Alyeska consortium sought
to increase their profits, it was discovered that by laying off one
seaman, one could save the equivalent of more than $150,000
per year. Then, when no disaster occurred, another manager
could decide to cut another seaman, and then another.' By
the time the Exxon Valdez sailed up to the Valdez Terminal to
load up with oil for the return to voyage to Long Beach, Cali-
fornia, she carried only sixteen seamen. The added workload on
32. "The vigilance over tanker traffic that was established in the early days of
pipeline flow had given way to complacency and neglect." OIL SPILL COMMISSION,
supra note 29, at iii.
33. As part of the fishermen's continuing attempts to wake up the official players
and the public to the dangers of the tanker operations, one skipper pleaded in a
public meeting on that night of March 23, "Gentlemen, it's not what if, but when."
Thirty minutes later it happened. Speech of Captain Riki Ott to Valdez City Council
(March 23, 1989), in OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 29, app. N, at 10 (emphasis
added).
34. Along the Alaska coast, opprobrium directed against "MBA bean-counters" is
part of the wreck's local legacy.
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the crew had been compounded by cutbacks on ground crews.
Supertankers had originally been prepared for the voyage by
professional loading crews permanently stationed at the Valdez
terminal, to assure that ships would not be fractured or
stressed by improper loading procedures. To save costs, howev-
er, the Alyeska companies decided to discharge the professional
loading crews, requiring the ship's own crew to do that job as
well.35 As a result of these cost-cutting measures, the risk that
crews would be operating with insufficient sleep and insufficient
ability to navigate their craft through the iceberg-strewn ship-
ping lanes of the Gulf of Alaska-and the disasters that could
follow-were risks that were passed on, in effect, to the envi-
ronment and the public.
Then there's the question of single hull tankers versus double
hull tankers. By building single hull tankers, the company
saved about two million dollars per ship, but in the event of a
major collision, this meant that oil would be discharged directly
into the sea. So long as a major spill didn't occur (or economic
accounting for spills remained unlikely), however, that money
was saved. The logic of the managers who made the decision
not to buy double hull tankers, and to lobby strenuously and
successfully against governmental efforts to require such double
hull vessels, was defensible in corporate terms so long as a
major disaster did not occur. In retrospect, with Exxon alone
absorbing more than four billion dollars in economic damages
and fines, the calculus seems naive. However, in an industry
where most lesser spills are never identified or picked up by
the popular media, where government regulation has been ten-
35. When a single hulled supertanker is being loaded with oil, the job has to be
done carefully. If the middle tanks are filled first, the ship sinks in the middle and
the bow and the stern ends lift up cracking the boat in two; if the bow and the
stern tanks are filled first the middle lifts up, cracking the boat in two. A single-
hulled supertanker like the Exxon Valdez is basically a huge mass of 53 million gal-
lons of heavy, hot crude oil, surrounded by a thin shell of steel 987 feet long and
less than one and one-half inches thick, all of which is plowing along at 16 knots
through iceberg-littered sea lanes, with only that thin tissue of metal between the oil
on the inside and the ocean on the outside.
One of the serious consequences of forcing a supertanker's crew to manage its
own vessel's loading is that, as in this case, officers who must take on the heavy
workload of navigating the ship in its subsequent passage through Prince William
Sound can be exhausted by their previous duties and efforts in the loading process.
See generally ART DAVIDSON, IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ (1990).
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tative and often dominated by industry, and where a relatively
short horizon of decisionmaking dominates management, the
decisions that were made were completely predictable. You
maximize profits and minimize outlays if you can... and you
can. Costs, and this includes the risks of disasters as in the
Alaska case, can be externalized onto the public and to the
commons, and unless there is an incident which forces an ac-
counting, economic externalization will remain a powerful be-
havioral logic.
Accordingly, as with the regulatory response to pollution
incidents like Kepone, the Alaska oil spill only belatedly led to
renewed recognition of the need for more stringent governmen-
tal oversight, both state and federal, of the oil industry's north-
ern empire.36
b. The Atlantic Ground Fisheries, Off the Coast of New
England
The Atlantic fisheries, off the coast of New England, offer
another setting where the externalization phenomenon has
become dramatically visible, but in this case, unlike the oil spill
and pollution scenarios, both the effect and the cause are readi-
ly visible to the public and to the political process.
In the waters of the Atlantic off Cape Cod, there historically
has existed an extraordinary fishery on what is known as
George's Bank, an underwater plateau with some of the same
rich natural conditions found in the Gulf of Alaska. With nutri-
ent-laden upwelling currents and remarkable spawning habitat,
the George's Bank fishery historically produced a sustainable
annual yield of more than 350 million pounds of high quality
groundfish--cod, haddock, halibut, and yellow-tail flounder, as
well as other commercial fish species. Rugged little family-
owned boats from ports all along the coast of New England and
the maritime provinces of Canada went out to the banks and
brought back the fresh fish that supplied a substantial part of
the North American market.
36. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1986 West & Supp.
1995); ALASKA STAT. § 37.14.400 (1993).
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But the Bank's fishery produced a scenario of classic econom-
ics, a tragedy of the commons." When the electronic and me-
chanical technology of fishing fleets began to increase in the
1960s, factory ships from Europe began taking massive hauls of
fish from George's Bank, so that by the early 1970s fish popula-
tions and yields began to drop. In 1976 the federal Fishery and
Conservation Management Act 8 temporarily solved the prob-
lems created by the foreign fishing fleet and set up the perplex
we have today. The Magnuson Act, as it is called, extended the
nation's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to 200 hundred
miles and effectively barred foreign ships from George's Bank
and other coastal fisheries.39 That legislation bought time for
several years and brought back yields. In a classic example of
exploitation of the commons, however, new American vessels
soon rushed in to take advantage of what was recognized as a
resource trove. While technology escalated dramatically, the size
of the fleet doubled in ten short years, in part exploiting subsi-
dies the fishermen had lobbied from Congress."
The results were predictable: beginning in the early 1980s
the size and quantity of groundfish began to drop (with two
years of short term reversals when spawning conditions proved
particularly good). Quota regulations were instituted, but were
politically undercut in 1982."' The more that populations
dropped, the harder the fishing boats worked to keep up their
catch yields. By 1991 it was clear that there was a disaster at
hand. Fisherman were spending more time at sea, harvesting
fewer and fewer fish, and the fish they were catching were ever
37. [T]he oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the
philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically
to the shibboleth of the "freedom of the seas." Professing to believe in
the "inexhaustible resources of the oceans," they bring species after spe-
cies of fish and whales closer to extinction.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1245 (1968).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
39. In an International Court of Justice case, the United States successfully
barred Canada from all but the northern sixth of George's Bank. Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct.
12).
40. Direct subsidies for the purchase of fishing vessels provided guaranteed fi-
nancing for new boats and equipment. The fishermen also benefitted from Reagan-era
tax subsidies that were extended generally and generously to permit accelerated de-
preciation in the purchase of capital assets.
41. See infra note 46.
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younger and smaller.42 The stock of groundfish that survived
to spawn was being decimated. In 1994, the groundfish industry
crashed, as populations dropped below viable commercial levels.
Finally, an emergency moratorium was imposed, and it will be
years before groundfish populations will be rebuilt sufficiently
to start commercial fishing again.4'
The perspective of the crews and captains in the fishing in-
dustry followed the Kepone script. For some, there was a pow-
erful inclination to deny reality, the internal veil of operational
expediency pulled over their eyes. They continued to insist,
against the evidence of the scientists and their own declining
catches, that the fisheries resource was not disappearing, that
the government should not be concerned; the fisheries would
inevitably come back, and, in the meantime, no restriction on
fishing efforts should be imposed." Other captains and crews
recognized what they were doing to their common resource, but
were impelled by circumstances and market forces to go on
fishing. They had no alternative: if they didn't, someone else
would, and each month, as long as they could catch anything,
they still had to try to pay the mortgages on their boats and
homes. "[It's] like the last buffalo hunts," said one fishermen. "I
don't know what happened to the buffalo hunters years ago, but
without rules and regulations that same thing [will] happen to
the . .. fisherman."45
Again, the individual actors in this resource theater were
locked into a situation where they understandably wanted to
42. As catches fell, crew sizes were decreased to try to stretch out the meager
returns for the benefit of boat owners. By 1994, boats that had been fishing with a
crew of five in 1977 were sometimes fishing with a crew of only one-and that one
was the skipper himself, who tied the wheel of the ongoing boat as he went back to
the work deck to sort and stow the catch of each drag of the nets, while the boat
plowed along on the next drag.
43. See Eleanor H. Dorsey, The 602 Guidelines on Overfishing: A Perspective from
New England, in NATIONAL COALITION FOR MARINE CONSERVATION, CONSERVING
AMERICA'S FISHERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE MAGNUSON
ACT (R.H. Stroud ed., 1994).
44. Richard Gutting, an attorney lobbyist for the industry, argued that declining
populations, if they existed, were due to pollution, loss of wetlands, natural climate
cycles and natural reproductive cycles-not overfishing-implying that relatively un-
regulated fishing should be allowed to continue. Declining Fisheries, Weekend Edition
(National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 3, 1994).
45. Id. (quoting Ed Miller of Montauk, N.Y.).
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maximize their individual profit, and could, in the short term at
least, pass on their depredations onto a much larger and diffuse
group-onto the public, the public resource, and the North
Atlantic fishery context as a whole. In the fisheries setting,
however, the externalization process is far easier to see in both
cause and effect. One can see the externality in exactly the
same terms as the profit-units of fish that are, or are not,
there to be caught.
The fisheries case is the rare situation where the circle can
be seen to be closed: the industry that hurts the resource is the
one that ultimately is most directly hurt by its own actions.
Note, however, that this doesn't mean that the market forces
instinctively are capable of self-correction to protect the com-
mons.
Even when they can see the crash of the groundfisheries and
acknowledge that it results from their continued overfishing,
the individual market players are locked into playing out the
tragedy of the commons. It now appears that, even if an eight-
year moratorium can re-build groundfish stocks to the point
where they can sustain a commercial fishery, it will take far
longer to reach a maximum sustainable yield at the historical
levels of the George's Bank fishery. The fishing industry cannot
voluntarily self-impose such a moratorium; it requires govern-
ment regulation, strictly enforced.
B. The Need for Regulation
Looking at these three different environmental settings-the
dumping of Kepone wastes, industry practices leading to the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the crash of commercial fisher-
ies-the conclusion seems inevitable that there is a practical
need for some form of regulation to offset the dynamic power
and inside perspective of human decisionmakers in the market-
place who are so powerfully inclined to externalize costs onto
the public. There is an inevitable utilitarian need for good fenc-
es, imposing civic values and a long term civic perspective upon
market processes. This need not necessarily be governmental
regulation, but from where else will it come?
As observed, voluntary self regulation within an industry is
not a credible strategy, at least absent h credibly strong govern-
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mental backdrop. The common law is a possibility. The common
law is a complex system that integrates some public values into
private actions. The common law faces severe limitations, how-
ever, in each of the environmental settings here considered. In
none of these settings was the common law a sufficient prior
constraint or deterrent to induce the market to absorb the cost
of what it was doing by pulling back. As noted briefly below,
environmental lawsuits since the early 1970s have created some
degree of deterrent expectation in market players, but on a
scale that is clearly insufficient to integrate the public interest
fully into industrial decisions.
Market-based approaches to the implementation of public
values are indeed possible and desirable in many cases, for if a
public value can be integrated into the market calculus, most of
us consider the market an extremely effective social mechanism.
The problem is that implementation of market-based approach-
es may require more, rather than less, government action and
ultimately will be resisted insofar as they still represent costs
which economic actors would prefer to externalize. In the fisher-
ies field, for instance, commentators have urged that the re-
source commons be "privatized" by giving the existing
boatowners an ITQ (individual transferable quota) quasi-
property right in a share of the annual allowable catch, antici-
pating that each stakeholder would then help to enforce the
overall maximum quota limits, and ITQ trades would assure
the most efficient allocation of investment and effort.46 But the
setting and adjusting of quotas remains a critical function for
government, as is determining how the ITQs are to be defined
and who gets them, how they are to be measured in practice
and enforced, and how ongoing implementation is to be moni-
tored to assure that the system works. As with the tradable
rights provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,47 the
system is not greatly simplified by adoption of market incen-
tives, and the trading mechanisms become even more fiendishly
complex when they must address multiple pollutants or multi-
ple fish species with different characteristics.
46. See Franz T. Litz, Harnessing Market Forces in Natural Resources Manage-
ment: Lessons from the Surf Clam Industry, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 335 (1994).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (Supp. III 1991).
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There are other economically-oriented forms of regulation.
Tax policy and federal spending policy can provide potent incen-
tives to market players to accommodate important public val-
ues. As Patrick Parenteau has written:
Environmental law does need to adapt to changing circum-
stances, to learn from its mistakes as well as its successes
and to continue to experiment with fresh approaches. We
certainly need more economic incentives-more carrots to go
with the sticks-but these cost money and we do not hear
the agents of change in Congress talking about using tax
and fiscal policies to achieve environmental goals. Nor do
we hear the reformers talking about eliminating the per-
verse federal policies and subsidies that encourage destruc-
tive practices such as overgrazing, unsustainable forestry,
wetland conversion and resource depletion.'
Market-tuned governmental environmental programs thus can
be part of what we refer to as "regulation," but because they
are no panacea and there are limits to what we can pay, the
crux of governmental policies implementing public values will
continue to lie in the area of mandatory positive rules.
Could we hope to rely on altruism? There is a growing etho-
logical literature exploring the possibility that humans might be
able to develop an altruistic gene, a gene for generosity and
selflessness,49 but suffice it to say that that does not currently
appear to be a sufficient likelihood upon which to bet our
society's long term welfare.
So if there appears to be a need for mandatory integration of
public values into the private actions that comprise the market-
place, the impetus probably must come from governmental
mandates. Whether these are regulations employing economical-
ly-based incentives, citizen-enforced laws or command and con-
trol regulatory systems reasonably designed and applied doesn't
matter, so long as they are efficient and effective. None of these
protective systems will be spontaneously implemented by the
marketplace.
48. Patrick Parenteau, 25 Years of Environmental Progress Comes to a Screeching
Halt, THE VALLEY NEWS (Vermont), April 23, 1995, at 8.
49. See RIcHARD DAvKINs, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); ROBERT TRIVERS, SOcIAL
EVOLUTION (1985).
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There lately has been strident criticism of regulation general-
ly. In the three environmental settings noted here, however
(and they are good examples of at least three general forms of
externalization), the problem arguably is not that there has
been too much regulation, but that there has been too little.
Consider Kepone. In that case the market forces drove to the
point of disaster before industries were forced to take account
of the consequences of decisions that they had made for more
than a decade. What could have been done better? Clearly there
should have been enforced public standards that the managers
of Allied and LSP knew they had to live up to-standards for
workplace safety and environmental discharges sufficiently
strict to prevent the harms that occurred, standards enforced by
inspections and implementation by outsiders, not relying on
insiders.
Where was government in the Kepone story? Federal agency
inspectors and officials did not constitute an effective enforce-
ment system.0 Virginia's workplace safety officials apparently
were not heard from, and its water pollution officials did not
react in 1974 when they learned that LSP's discharges had
knocked out the Hopewell sewage treatment capacity. The state
merely decided that a study should be commenced to determine
what the proper effluent limits for Kepone might be. A year lat-
er, the state did require LSP to install pretreatment equipment,
but then did nothing when nineteen out of twenty-one samples
showed violation of its requirements. Local officials, whose
citizens were most directly impacted, were, of the three levels
of government regulation, apparently the least interested in
enforcing environmental requirements, even when the sewage
sludge digester at the Hopewell sewage treatment plant was
rendered inoperative. Why do you suppose such governmental
lassitude occurred in the face bf a clear toxic threat? The an-
swer is not hard to find. In the balance of momentum between
governmental regulators and industries that produce jobs and
payrolls, the pragmatics of power rarely lie with government.
Where was governmental regulation in the Gulf of Alaska? In
the Alaska oil transport trade, it was clear that the industry
50. See infra note 74. Neither EPA nor other regulatory agencies appear to have
taken action prior to the public outcry.
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had become, in effect, self-regulating. The Coast Guard and
other federal and state government agencies repeatedly went
along with the seriatim reductions in crew sizes, the lack of
mandatory sea lanes, scaled-down requirements for response
preparations to handle oil spills, and so on. When the state
government tried to establish several regulatory requirements
for loading and shipping facilities, the industry successfully
persuaded a trial court to throw out the state's rules on the
basis of claimed federal preemption."' After the Exxon Valdez
spill, it became clear that both state and federal governments
had to tighten the standards required of the industry and actu-
ally to enforce them to be sure that they are not subverted.
The regulatory proposition is perhaps clearest in the fisheries
setting. Where were the regulators on George's Bank? In the
Magnuson Act, eight regional fisheries management councils
were set up to monitor the resource and to provide standards to
prevent overfishing by establishing a "total allowable catch."52
The job of actually regulating a fishery turns out to be difficult,
however. Politically it requires a strong and insistent regulatory
program that can withstand the industry's relentless resistance.
51. Chevron v. Hammond, No. A77-195-Civ., (D. Alaska, June 30, 1978); see also
Chevron v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984). When the Ninth Circuit got a
portion of this opinion on appeal it reversed, but in the meantime the state govern-
ment had withdrawn most of the state regulations that had been resisted by the oil
industry. See UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA SEA GRANT LEGAL RESEARCH TEAM, FEDERAL
PREEMPTION CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE AR-
RANGEMENTS (1989).
52. The total allowable catch which sets the baseline for defining overfishing is
also statutorily required to achieve "optimal yield . . . for the United States fishing
industry," 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (1988), a standard that has been interpreted to
extend the catch beyond the safe "sustainable yield" level, using "economic [or] so-
cial . . . factor[s]," 16 U.S.C. § 1802(21)(B) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991), a phrase that
has invited exploitative lobbying pressures and legal challenges of regulation.
See Fisherman's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. 385, 386 (E.D. Va.
1994) (requiring regulators to make a massive increase in allowed total catch). "Un-
fortunately ... the judge's decision did not create more fish." Pierce, Summer Floun-
der Management Woes, DMF NEWS (Division of Marine Fisheries, Mass.) Jan.-Mar.
1995, at 6. Subsequently the judge threatened the Secretary of Commerce with a con-
tempt of court citation for not ordering increased catches while the case was on ap-
peal, before which threat the Secretary retreated, allowing the disastrous quota ex-
pansion despite evidence that current data on illegal fishing and poor reproduction
demonstrated that Judge Doumar's decision had been drastically wrong on the merits.
Taylor Whiteside, Fisherman's Dock Cooperative v. Brown as a Case Study of the
Different Paradigms of Scientific and Judicial Decisionmaking 12-13 (unpublished
manuscript, Boston College Law School).
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Scientifically it requires a technically competent job of estimat-
ing varying species populations at all age levels to estimate
survival levels necessary to achieve and sustain maximum
yields. It requires accurate catch data and the stipulation of en-
forcement standards that can practically be enforced: quotas,
limits on numbers of trips, mesh sizes, size limits, etc.53 And
then it requires actual enforcement.
C. Resistance to Regulation
But the market forces that necessitate regulation in the first
place do not go to sleep when government enters the field.
Instead, the logic of externalization of costs continues powerful-
ly to motivate resistance and undercutting of regulatory efforts.
In the New England fisheries for example, as catches started
to dwindle, the regional management council, using Coast
Guard enforcement on the water and state conservation officers
on the docks, tried to enforce landing quotas and trip limita-
tions, but their efforts were immediately rolled back by industry
protests and political backlash. Under political pressure in
1982, the New England council dropped all numerical quotas
and was persuaded to redefine the "total allowable catch"
(which sets the baseline for defining illegal "overfishing" under
the terms of the Act). Henceforth, the "total allowable catch"
was defined by rule to be retrospectively whatever the maxi-
mum amount that the fishermen actually caught. Thus, in
theory, in order to violate the law, fishermen would have to
catch more than they could feasibly catch.' Even where there
is law on the books and a regulator in the field, it appears that
53. Even the councils' ability to regulate is under a cloud. There has been a sub-
stantial continuing question whether the councils' guidelines are enforceable, since an
amendment to the Magnuson Act says that "The Secretary shall establish advisory
guidelines (which shall not have the force and effect of law), based on the national
standards, to assist in the development of fishery and management plans." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1851(b) (emphasis added). Some have argued that this must be interpreted as pre-
cluding other than advisory actions. See Dorsey, supra note 43, at 187.
54. This regulatory vignette was promulgated in the 1982 Groundfish Manage-
ment Plan Amendments of the New England Regional Fisheries Management Council.
See 47 Fed. Reg. 43705 (Mon., Oct. 4, 1982) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 651). Besides
dropping the quotas, the regulation dropped limits on the number of fishing trips
boats could make, and retreated to a reliance upon limitations of minimum net mesh
sizes, a high seas regulatory approach that has been virtually impossible to police.
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the market forces that press participants to make profits and
pass on costs to the public, end up undermining the regulatory
effort. Regulators' inability to regulate reflects the powerfully
broad and intrusive effort that a focused industry can bring to
bear.
Like water flowing downhill, market forces and the Coasian
natural laws that drive them inherently resist any artificial
barriers that curtail their profit-maximizing externalizations of
social costs. To place a single sandbag into the current is diffi-
cult and not likely to have significant effect. As others are
added with great effort, the natural forces still pour around
them. When finally a working accumulation of sandbags is se-
cured, the waters may turn to the path of less resistance, but
do not stop trying to infiltrate and undercut the obstacles block-
ing their maximum satisfaction. Across the entire face of the
environmental law dike, the pressures are felt. Lobbyists, law-
yers, media managers, PACs, and the host of political players
apply insistent and comprehensive pressures within all three
branches of government to obtain specialized subsidies and to
suborn programs created to look out for broader societal inter-
ests. Agencies are blunted or captured by the classic double-
pronged tactics of the marketplace-strident resistance and
seduction-and when citizens attempt to get around the phe-
nomenon of agency capture55 by going to the courts, the forces
55. See NIS, supra note 1, at 722, 764-66, 827-28.
Attorney General Olney wrote to the president of a railroad in 1892 in re-
sponse to the latter's plea for abolition of the ICC, in effect "don't worry":
The Commission . . . is, or can be made, of great use to the rail-
roads. It satisfies the popular clamor for government supervision of rail-
roads, at the same time that the supervision is almost entirely nominal.
Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will
be found to take the . . . railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort
of barrier between the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of
protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad inter-
ests.... The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to
utilize it.
Letter from Richard Olney to Charles Perkins (1892), in Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective
Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1954).
'We don't want to be a regulatory agency. We want to be a development agen-
cy on our national lands," said former Sec. of Interior Manuel Lujan, in a September
1992 speech to coal industry executives and a press conference thereafter, explaining
why his department would continue to refrain from strict enforcement of stripmining
regulations. Keith Schneider, U.S. Mine Inspectors Charge Interference by Agency Di-
rector, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at 1, 30.
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of the marketplace try to undercut citizen standing and judicial
remedies.
The consequences of these long-thwarted pressures of resis-
tance to public civic regulation can be seen in the corporate
counter reformation that has currently seized the political mo-
ment in Washington, noted in our fourth inquiry below.
II. THE DRAMATIC GROWTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Looking back over the past twenty-five years it is obvious
that our knowledge of environmental science, law, and policy
has increased exponentially. Environmental science has in-
creased in sophistication and volume. When the Kepone tragedy
occurred, scientific data was still often being logged manually
and spatially manipulated with grease pencils on transparent
mylar sheets laid over paper topographic maps. Today we have,
for instance, nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) techniques for
multi-spectrum chemical analyses of environmental pollutants
in the sediments of the Chesapeake Bay.56 We have far better
knowledge of the behavior of water and pollutants carried in
water to the benthos of a river, an estuary and a bay system.
We know a great deal more about how organisms interconnect
in complex natural systems, and how artificial incursions
disequilibriate the systems. We have computer-based Geograph-
ic Information Systems (GIS) for multi-variable mapping and
analysis of what scientists from a variety of disciplines contrib-
ute to complex resource issues. We have gained substantial
improvements in natural resources damages assessment,57 as
56. We also have learned that organochlorines may be responsible in part for
serious human symptoms, including reproductive consequences. Certain of the family
of such chlorines have been implicated, for instance, as estrogen mimics which have
been shown in some cases to cause serious gender disruptions in vertebrate organ-
isms. See Marla Cone, Sexual Confusion in the Wild. From Gators to Gulls, Scientists
Say Pollution May Be Playing Havoc With Animals' Hormones, L.A. TIMES Oct. 2,
1994, at Al. If you want to get the attention of the public, including corporate execu-
tives, about the diffuse environmental consequences of industrial extranalities, bring-
ing it home to the genitals is often an effective strategy.
57. See Danielle Stager, Comment, From Kepone to Exxon Valdez Oil and Beyond:
An Overview of Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 749
(1995).
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well as a variety of technical improvements on restoration tech-
niques to repair some of the injuries caused by environmental
disruptions."8
Of course, the more we know, the more we don't know, but
the growth in scientific knowledge means that we will never be
able return to the ignorance of the 1960s when people could say
they did not know what the possible consequences of their ac-
tions in the environment might be.
A. The Growth of Environmental Law
As some of the other presentations in this symposium
note,59 it is probably true that the Kepone case could not hap-
pen today as it did in the 1960s and 1970s, not because the
tendency to externalize has disappeared, but because today it is
counteracted and balanced, to a substantial degree at least, by
mandatory regulation.
Since the day that Allied began discharging Kepone pesticide
wastes in 1966, the American legal system has developed an
extraordinary structure and volume of environmental law that
did not exist at all, or existed only in extremely primitive form
at that time.
Instead of running through a sprawling catalogue of the
literally dozens of major statutes and nonstatutory environmen-
tal law principles now on the books, it makes sense rather to
emphasize that what has evolved is a remarkably intricate
legal ecosystem, a biodiversity of law. The structures and doc-
trines of environmental law today are not of any one model, nor
even of a dozen models. By an ongoing evolution of legal re-
58. The latter areas have profited from Alaska's sad experience, including hopeful
new technologies for capturing and retrieving ocean born oil spills. In fisheries man-
agement we find that the electronic technology that allowed fishermen to target un-
derwater schools of fish with great accuracy, has also allowed scientists to do accu-
rate population surveys, habitat analysis and harvest data so as to permit improved
regulatory management of the resource. In settings like the ancient forests, ecologists
have discovered remarkably important linkages between diverse natural habitats (as
opposed to tree farms) and the maintenance of climate and water balance within the
forest as well as the ecological interconnectedness between indicator species like the
spotted owl and the salmon that spawn in the streams running from the federal
forest habitats.
59. See, in this symposium, Goldfarb, supra note 2; Rodgers, supra note 25.
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sponses to hazards as they arose, continued experimentation,
trial and error, midcourse revisions upon midcourse revisions,
we have built a body of many different kinds of law aimed at
different types of problems, presumably seeking optimal enforce-
ability and reasonableness in resolving important problems.
It is this complex diversity of law that makes it probable
that the Kepone case on its own terms is now an artifact (at
least so long as the Contract for America remains unenacted).
1. The Common Law
To some extent the change in legal accountability is attribut-
able to an evolution in the common law. Twenty years ago, for
example, there was no field called "toxic torts." Today there are
specialized toxic torts courses taught at many law schools; there
are casebooks and several online and loose-leaf law reporter
services dedicated in whole or part to toxic torts. If the Kepone
case were to break today, it would be far easier for the courts
to manage the large classes of potential plaintiffs, to process
epidemiological evidence (especially now after Daubert, without
the obstacles of the Frye rule60 ), and to seek innovative reme-
dies like medical monitoring, fund recoveries, restoration, and
the like. Today, under public nuisance and other retooled com-
mon law actions, we also have advanced possibilities for natural
resources remedies, mitigation and restoration standards, and a
variety of novel equitable remedies.6 '
In the Exxon Valdez oil spill case, it is noteworthy that the
State of Alaska itself, and the vast majority of private plaintiffs
who sought relief in the courts after that disaster, primarily
relied upon the common law. The multi-billion dollar settle-
ments that have been coming out of those cases surely demon-
strate a credible internalizing precedent for corporate managers.
We do not know what the total civil settlements for the Kepone
case-both state and private plaintiffs-added up to, but the
best guess is that it was less than twenty million dollars. Com-
pare to this Exxon's liabilities of more than four billion dollars
60. Daubert v. Merrill-Dow, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), rev'g Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
61. See NLS, supra note 1, at 142-70.
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in civil damages and response expenses, and it is clear that the
common law has discovered that environmental injuries are
real.62
But the common law is limited in its effectiveness by the fact
that it is typically retrospective and localized in scope." The
common law often requires proof of the unprovable. When pol-
lution like Kepone physically contacts tens of thousands of
people in widely differing modes and concentrations, how easy
is it to prove in a common law action whose symptoms were
caused by that exposure, and whose by other causes? Further,
for tort actions beyond human health, it is an even more diffi-
cult job for the common law to capture harms to wildlife and
natural systems, a job that Judge Merhige found to be too
daunting in Pruitt," that is only a bit easier today.
But positive law presents a very different story. When legis-
latures decree public values and establish mandatory standards
to implement them, the legal system is able to take account of
science beyond the capabilities of any common law court. A
toxic discharge can be prohibited or restricted by a police power
regulatory system without having to prove who is being hurt
and how much. Thus it is in the realm of public law that the
environmental law evolution really flowered.
Starting at the end of the 1960s, there began a parade of
regulatory statutes the like of which we probably will never see
again, virtually all driven by popular political fervor:65 the Na-
62. The total Exxon cleanup and civil damages bill will undoubtedly exceed four
billion dollars, and perhaps more than twice that if some of the pending punitive
damage claims are successful.
The largest tort recoveries in recent years have often been for environmental
torts, including asbestos poisoning. In 1989, each of two workers exposed to asbestos
settled for $76 million. Amy Dockser Marcus, Juries Rule Against 'Tort Reform' With
Huge Awards, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1990, at B1 (reporting the Coyne and McCoubrey
v. Celotex settlement). The structured settlement of a recent asbestos class action was
for $4 billion (settlement available from Ness Motley, Loadholt, Richardson, and
Poole, 151 Meetinghouse St., Charleston, S.C. 29402).
63. Most common law environmental cases appear to be after-the-fact adjudica-
tions because anticipatory injunctions are so often difficult to obtain.
64. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
65. Significant federal statutes were indeed passed prior to the late '60s, includ-
ing most notably the Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988)), the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of
1968, Pub. L. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287
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tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969,66 the Clean Air Act of
1970,67 the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,6" the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination, and the Noise Control Act of
1972,69 the Clean Water" and Coastal Zone Management
Acts of 1972,"' and more than two dozen others. 2 In the
years that have followed, the scope and number of environmen-
tal statutes have continued to grow.
These modern statutory systems, wittingly or unwittingly,
have reflected Rachel Carson's teachings, addressing ecological
and economic values and problems that had not been acknowl-
edged or had been inadequately accounted for in previous public
and private law, targeting public as well as private enterprises.
(1988)), and the Parklands Act, which was embodied in the Department of Transpor-
tation Act of 1966 § 4(f), Pub. L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931, and the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1968, § 18, Pub. L. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §
138 (1988)). Each of these, however, was relatively adjectival and circumscribed in
effective scope, cf. the following list, and less the product of wide popular appeal than
the backchamber pressure from the midcentury remnants of the early conservation
movement, motivated by a rarefied noblesse. This is not to take away from those
important and dramatic accomplishments, but rather to note that they were less a
function of the new post-SILENT SPRING paradigm shifts.
66. Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
(1988)).
67. Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
68. Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
69. Pub. L. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918
(1988)).
70. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-499, 86
Stat. 815 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
71. Pub. L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464
(1988)).
72. By my count there were 27 important environmental statutes passed in the
three years after NEPA. See ZYGMuNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., SUPPLEMENT FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 359 app. at 9-16 (1994). Only
Jimmy Carter's years come close, with 20 in an equivalent span, many of which were
perfecting amendments. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., TEACHERS MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY at 360-62
(1992).
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2. Kepone and Statutory Law. What has changed in the Public
Law, as it Would Have Applied to Kepone?
Actually, the legal structure that deals with the most direct
poisoning exposures encountered in the Kepone case has not
changed much at all: the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) was created in 1970, before Life Sciences
began Allied's tolled Kepone production.73 But OSHA has nev-
er been a particularly powerful, consistent, or effective agency;
indeed, it was almost eliminated in the early 1980s. OSHA
enforcement has been chronically criticized as overconcerned
with technical detail and generally ineffective. In late 1974,
OSHA received a complaint from an LSP worker who claimed
to have been fired for refusing to work in the dangerous
Kepone-laden work setting. OSHA merely sent an inquiry to
LSP, and after receiving a mollifying response from LSP, OSHA
closed the file without even making an on-site inspection.74
Nevertheless, conditions at LSP were so egregious that even in
1975 it is altogether likely that the occupational health prob-
lems in the LSP workplace would eventually have reached
OSHA attention, which would have led to some kind of federal
enforcement of health standards in the workplace, and fines
(though those may have been minimal).75 Since the Kepone
case, moreover, many workers have achieved a heightened con-
sciousness of their own vulnerability to workplace chemicals
and of their regulatory rights, so that it is possible that condi-
tions as they existed in LSP would not long continue in a simi-
lar modem workplace.
73. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. 91-596, 84
Stat. 1590.
74. Stone, supra note 1, at 129. The problem with OSHA may be that it is
spread so extremely thin, theoretically entrusted with inspecting more than three
million jobsites with only a few hundred inspectors, arousing resentment and poten-
tial legal challenge at every turn. When OSHA's regulations were broad and flexible,
administrative lawyers criticized them in court as void for vagueness. When the agen-
cy responded with excruciatingly precise details, industry lawyers responded with
criticism of arbitrariness and unreasonableness. With the diminution of union power,
OSHA has lacked a politically viable base.
75. Cf. the Film Recovery case, where OSHA fined the corporation that had been
convicted of homicide in the death of a worker by open exposure to cyanide fumes an
initial sum of $4855, subsequently reduced by half when the company protested. Ste-
ven Ferrey, Hard Time: Criminal Prosecution for Polluters, 10 THE AMICUS J. 11
(1988).
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In the field of water pollution regulation, however, there has
been a marked increase in the standards and procedures of
both federal and state water pollution control. As Professor
Goldfarb chronicles in his contribution to this symposium,76
beginning in 1972, the Clean Water Act 77 tied state and feder-
al regulatory structures together in a system that applies in-
dustry-wide discharge standards with enforcement procedures
that dischargers must take seriously, including criminal as well
as civil penalties.
Beyond the Clean Water Act, perhaps the most dramatic
change in positive law has been in the creation of highly spe-
cialized federal toxic substances statutes. In the case of Kepone,
today Allied would face strengthened market access restrictions
for pesticides78 and direct stringent regulatory attention upon
the disposal of hazardous wastes. The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA)79 and Superfund (the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA)) ° subject any industry dealing with chemicals
to excruciating detail in the handling of hazardous wastes and
strenuous requirements for correcting contaminations of land
and water. The toxic sites where Kepone wastes were dis-
charged-Allied's storage lagoons, Gravelly Run, soils around
the LSP plant, and waters downstream from the sewage treat-
ment works-would face a mind-numbing regulatory process.
Allied's liability would be strict and inexorable for its own ac-
tions and the actions of its tolled partner, LSP.5'
Adding a special punch to the corporate calculus that faces
these new statutory systems is the advent of environmental
criminal law. Criminal liabilities that could have been applied
against environmental polluters from knowing endangerment of
public health all the way up to homicide had always existed on
the books, but were generally dormant. The post-1970 federal
76. Goldfarb, supra note 2.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988).
78. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
81. Although liability for foreign maquiladoras is developing only slowly, domestic
tolling agreements have been readily subjected to federal hazardous substance liabili-
ty. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
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statutes each rather matter-of-factly included criminal penalties,
but for the first decade after 1970 there was relatively little
criminal prosecution under the general criminal laws of the
states or the federal environmental statutes' criminal provi-
sions.
What was rare at the time of Kepone, however, has subse-
quently become an accepted term: "environmental crime." In the
1980s the rate of prosecution of environmental crimes increased
substantially, perhaps as an unwitting byproduct of the Reagan
administration's law and order policies." And look at the effect
of the Reagan administration's sentencing guidelines! In the
Kepone case only Hundtofte and Moore were indicted as indi-
viduals. When Judge Merhige said, "[Nlobody is going to jail in
this case,"83 he may have frustrated the prosecutor's attempts
to induce other Allied executives to testify against the company,
but he was only carrying on a long tradition of not treating
environmental crimes as serious offenses. Today, however, cor-
porate executives as individuals, both within Allied and in LSP,
would clearly be actively considered for prosecution.
And here's what would happen to convicted corporate manag-
ers in a case like Kepone under the Reagan sentencing guide-
lines:
If the executives were shown to have mishandled hazardous
or toxic substances, they would receive a base level count of
eight;"
82. See Helen J. Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective
View, 22 Envtl. L. 1315-27 (1992). Federal prosecution took a major turn upward in
October, 1982, with the beginning of the U.S. EPA's centralized investigation program
and the creation of the U.S. Dept. of Justice's Environmental Crimes Section. Eight
years later, the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 poured further resources into the
program. Pub. L. 101-593, 104 Stat. 2962 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321, notes (Supp.
V 1993)). Prior to 1982, federal environmental criminal convictions were minimal. In
the following ten years, a total of 675 defendants were convicted of environmental
crimes, including 226 corporations and 450 individuals, with over 332 million dollars
in fines imposed, and sentences on defendants totaling almost 190 years of confine-
ment. Brunner, supra note 82, at 1315-27.
83. Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 661.
84. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMI1SSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES §
2Q1. 2(a) (1994).
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add to this an increase of six levels for repeated discharg-
es;8
5
add another two levels for the fact that the executives were
exercising direct leadership in the pollution activities; 6
and you come up with an offense level of sixteen. This trans-
lates into a mandatory jail sentence of 21-27 months in jail."
For Hundtofte and Moore, there would be an additional four
counts because the LSP discharges knocked out a public utility,
the Hopewell sewage system, bringing their punishment to a
level of twenty (33-41 months in jail).8"
At trial, Judge Merhige said, "I hope after this sentence, that
every corporate official, every corporate employee that has any
reason to think that pollution is going on, will think, 'If I don't
do something about it now, I am apt to be out of a job tomor-
row.'8 9 It does not appear that anyone lost a job at Allied be-
cause of the Kepone debacle, but what the Reagan criminal
guidelines add today is a much more tangible worry that indi-
vidual executives may be sent to jail. That possibility must
surely tend to focus the mind of the potential externalizer.0
Needless to say, there are many other state and federal laws
that would now come to bear in a latterday Kepone case. The
Pollution Prevention Act of 1992 might help discourage waste
creation in the first place.9' The Kepone facilities' dust emis-
sions would now come under scrutiny under the Clean Air Act,
under Virginia's state implementation plan enforcement and
85. Id. at § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A).
86. Id. at § 3B1.1(c).
87. For a similar computation of sentencing levels under the sentencing guide-
lines, see United States v. Rutana, 18 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1994).
88. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 84 at § 2Q1.2(b)(3); see also
chart found in ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., SUPPLEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 123 (1994).
89. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. 2672, 2692 (1992), affd without
opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995) (Judge Parker quoting Judge Merhige). The
judge's prediction may be directed toward corporate shutdowns as well as individual
discharges caused by pollution incidents.
90. Ted Rohrlich, Top Lawyers Get $400 an Hour as Fees, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1989, at 1.
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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under federal standards for toxic air pollutants. There are un-
doubtedly a dozen more such modern regulatory concerns.
What often appears to corporate managers as a bewildering
array of nets and toils thrown around their operations is built
up today of dozens of specific answers created by legislatures,
agencies, and courts addressing each of many serious problems
that we find arising from industrial facilities and other pollu-
tion sources.
This array of laws is not made up of simple-minded clones of
one regulatory model. Each has developed, from a specific prob-
lem, its own specific regulatory apparatus for addressing it.
Over the years since Kepone, moreover, there have been dozens
of midcourse corrections, in order to solve logjams that were
present in the original statutes, to fine-tune regulatory stan-
dards and to improve procedures where necessary. To observe
the evolution of the Clean Air Act, for instance, is to watch it
evolve from a well intentioned focus on defining actual thresh-
olds of human harm for a wide variety of pollutants in the
ambient air-an approach which turned out to be hellaciously
difficult in scientific terms, never mind in terms of politics and
enforcement-shifting gradually to a more enforceable regulato-
ry platform based on available technology standards, a lesson
learned from our societal experiments with water pollution con-
trol.
B. Environmental Policy and Some Points of Consensus
Over the past twenty-five years, there have been broad-based
public policy shifts toward environmental consciousness, some of
which may be viewed as points of consensus, at least in general
terms. In each case, of course, even if there is consensus in
principle, reactions differ widely when policies are applied to
specific facts. Unanimity on policy disappears and political
explosions occur when my ox is gored by your version of civic
values.
But we probably have reached some useful general agree-
ments. Few people in the 1960s at the start of the Kepone era,
for example, would have considered putting poison directly into
someone's property or drinking water, but dumping poisonous
wastes into a tributary of a river was considered to be some-
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thing else. As a general in the Army Corps of Engineers was
reported to have said, rivers were "God's garbage disposal sys-
tem."92 Out of sight out of mind was then a believable opera-
tional myth. Today, it never again will be.
To that extent at least, we may be able to say that there is
fundamental agreement about Coase's description of the
marketplace's tendency to externalize, and Rachel Carson's per-
ception that we live in a closed system. Instead of the willful
ignorance of the early 1960s, it seems that most of us now
concede that actions have consequences; externalities exist, go
somewhere, and have cumulative effects; there is no such thing
as a free lunch. Public policy appears to have incorporated the
recognition that externalities can ultimately be destructive and
must be accounted for.
Accordingly, there probably has been-at least until recent-
ly-a broadly-held acceptance of the proposition that individual
actors must be induced to act in the context of public values.
We cannot expect people to maximize the public good and mini-
mize the public detriments of their activities on the basis of
altruism, which is why we have law. At this level of generality,
of course, few specific answers are provided, but nevertheless
they are first principles from which to build.
Here is another major point of consensus: the air and water
and many other environmental indicators have gotten much
cleaner. The lively debate on this point today does not deny the
accomplishment, but rather turns on whether we should now
reduce our domestic environmental efforts and look for other
priorities, or continue striving to implement comprehensive
integrated environmental policies for a sustainable national
future. 93
92. In the Appalachians the common wisdom we youngsters were taught was that
water cleaned itself whenever it had flowed downhill across ten stones.
93. See GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH (1995). In a sophisticat-
ed version of the corporate mantra that was heard beginning with the first Earth
Day, that 'the pendulum (of environmental regulation) has now swung too far,' Gregg
Easterbrook argues that environmental protection resources now should be targeted
on the Third World, not on domestic environmentalism. This position would consign
domestic forests, public lands, endangered species, and similar natural resources to a
sad fate, and ignores the pattern-setting quality of environmental science, policy, and
law in the developed world. His arguments tend to ignore the systemic integrated
nature of environmental problems and their cure, instead treating environmental
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"Sustainable Development," as the fisheries example shows, is
another candidate for recognition as an important policy norm,
both nationally and internationally. Rather than a series of
behavioral disasters sequentially degrading economic resources,
the long term global public interest requires a scheme of behav-
ior that allows maximum sustainable yields-a principle incor-
porated in federal laws and in the 1992 United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development at Rio.94 Human ac-
tions which lower our ability to maintain quality of life over
future generations are normatively bad.
The "Precautionary Principle" is another candidate for con-
sensus-if what you are doing may have serious consequences,
but you don't know what all the consequences are, then when
in doubt, hesitate. NEPA reflects this conservative policy, self-
imposed upon the federal government, requiring agencies to do
what individuals rationally do in their own lives-look before
they leap.
And slowly, perhaps, environmental policy has evolved a
nascent recognition that the purportedly inevitable choice be-
tween environmental protection and economic progress is a
false trade off. From an overview perspective at a societal level,
and often even at an individual level as well, good ecology is
good economics. The recognition that environmental consider-
ations are utilitarian, and that environmental warnings may be
predictors of serious economic consequences, has encouraged
private actors and economic entities as large as the World Bank
to integrate environmental analysis into their planning, so as to
avoid the disasters that they stumbled into in past decades.95
protection efforts as add-on commodities. See also, THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET
(Robert Bailey, ed. 1995) (arguing that deforestation and global warming are not as
perilous as thought, but that the oceans are indeed in trouble).
Cf. FAYE DucHIN AND GLENN-MARiE LANGE, THE FUTURE OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT: ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1994) (arguing that we
are not doing enough); and MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENvIRONMEN-
TALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1995) (arguing that national
environmental groups are being blunted and co-opted).
94. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
874, 876-77 (1992) (Principle 1. Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sus-
tainable development. Principle 4. In order to achieve sustainable development, envi-
ronmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and
cannot be considered in isolation from it.)
95. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Multilateral Lending Banks, Environmental
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It should also be noted that one can probably find consensus
that environmental law has sometimes been stupid. Not every-
thing has been done accurately or appropriately in these years
of the evolution of environmental law. No consensus is likely
about which specific issues have been mistaken, but there are a
number of candidates. Can we, for example, afford the luxury of
"Cadillac cleanups" of CERCLA toxic contamination sites to the
point that the soil can be eaten?96 Few doubt that most of the
major statutes richly deserved some midcourse corrections and
improvements.
Others are more controversial, the strictures of the Delaney
Clause, for example. Risk assessment arguments over the past
ten years have shown the importance of intruding some ration-
ing of societal effort, some balance in assigning regulatory bur-
dens. The controversy is reflected in ongoing debates about the
Delaney Clause, the Food and Drug Act's absolute prohibition
of carcinogens in foods-a debate between the political and
administrative need for clear strict enforceability, and the dys-
functional possibilities of crude regulatory overkill."
Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures on the Lending Process: The Exam-
ple of Third World Dam Building Projects, 9 B.C. THiRD WORLD L.J. 169, 195, 208-
212 (1989).
96. "Cadillac cleanups" occur because, at least where toxic cleanups at someone
else's expense are concerned, neighbors and government officials tend to opt for the
most protective and hence most expensive cleanup standards. See NLS, supra note 1,
at 896-97.
97. The Delaney Clause of the federal Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)
(1988), forbids the presence in food of even the minutest amount of any substance
shown to be a carcinogen, even where that effect occurs only in large doses, while
tolerating statistically worse noncarcinogenic additives. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d
985 (9th Cir. 1992). A debate reflected within the environmental community shifts
between a perceived rational need for adjusting degrees of prohibitions to degrees of
relative risks, on one hand, and on the other a perceived need for a bright line stan-
dard to avoid the regulatory agencies' proclivity to dilute protections under industry
pressure. Compare Sagoff, Choosing Sides on Pesticides, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL AMICUS J. 10 (1994) (arguing for a more tolerant standard that would allow
flexibility but not wide-open cost-benefit balancing); with Editorial, Truth, Justice, and
the Delaney Clause, id. at 6 and Parenteau, supra note 48, at 8 ("The laws that have
worked best have been those that simply outlawed the offending activity: bans on
DDT, leaded gasoline, cancer-causing asbestos, ozone-depleting chemicals, whaling,
phosphates in detergents, billboards.")
Regulatory permit schemes, moreover, can often put great paperwork burdens
on regulated entities, sometimes may in fact conflict with one another, and impose
repetitive bureaucratic processing. Some suggestions have been made that it is time
to follow the German example, where industrial processes negotiate a broad spectrum
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Or the tone of environmental politics: are citizen groups fall-
ing prey to the Chicken Little syndrome, where they claim to
see only doom ahead and rely upon hyperbolic threats to gen-
erate support and momentum?98 Most environmentalists can
probably be faulted in at least a few cases for accentuating the
negative and minimizing the positive. The job of mobilizing
citizens and the media on important issues, however-the two
major sources of credible power in this society when one does
not have a corporate base-is not facilitated by euphemism and
seminar-like factual presentation styles. If nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) are to play a significant role in modem
societies, there will have to be accommodation to their rhetoric
and passions in order to access the real societal concerns they,
and often only they, can bring to the debate.
Or environmental criminal law: Has the criminal law, for all
its salutary effects in catching the serious attention of corporate
players, nevertheless often been too crude and blunt a legal
instrument? In the federal criminal statutes, at least, there
often seems to be little difference between actions that are
subject to civil liability and those that are subject to criminal
liability; criminal liability potentially covers so broad a range of
actions that vast discretion is left for the executive branch.99
As to environmental regulation generally, however, it seems
that there is some consensus, not only as to goals, but also as
to the continuing need for making standards as wise and effec-
tive as they can be, and we are nowhere near that yet.
III. GOVERNMENT CANNOT Do IT ALL-ACTIVE CITIZEN
ENGAGEMENT
Although it need be mentioned only briefly, it is nevertheless
important to acknowledge the critical role that has been played
and will continue to be played by citizens actively engaged in
master permit covering a variety of pollution regulatory concerns in one proceeding.
See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Coal Law from the Old World, 64 KY. L.J. 473 (1976).
98. See EASTERBROOK, supra note 93.
99. See Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal
Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867, 879-82
(1994).
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environmental law. Regulation may be necessary, but govern-
ment cannot do it alone.
American environmental law was born and shaped by active
citizen engagement in the governmental process, a phenomenon
of active democracy that virtually did not exist anywhere else
in the world. The civic responsibility of an informed and active
citizenry continues to be fundamentally important to the devel-
opment and implementation of environmental law, as it is to
democratic governance generally.' 0
We have already referred to the critical role of the common
law in the development of the environmental law system, and
that of course has been almost totally a citizen-based legal
development. But citizens have turned out to have a critical
role in the public law as well. It is not enough that statutes
and regulations are passed, and public officials are vested with
the authority and duty of enforcing them. State and federal
regulatory agencies by themselves have often proved unable to
implement the laws on the books.
Consider the Kepone case again: Where were the government
officials? They were virtually invisible. Probably the only way
the local, state, and federal government regulatory agencies
could have been induced to do their work would have been by
confrontation, cajolery, political threats, and media coverage fo-
cused by an active citizen initiative. In the Kepone case, prior
to the discovery of LSP's excesses, even citizens directly and
indirectly affected by the contamination (including the
watermen of the Bay) did not demonstrate such initiative, for a
variety of understandable reasons.
Compare citizen initiatives in the Gulf of Alaska to see a
very different model. Shortly after the Alaska pipeline began
pumping oil to the terminal in Valdez for loading into the sin-
gle-hulled supertankers of the West Coast fleet, commercial
fishermen began to organize to protest the dangers they saw
being created. The fishermen (some of whom worked for the oil
companies during most of the year), collected data about chemi-
100. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift in Para-
digms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L_A L. REV. 981,
989-93, 1004-07 (1994) (noting how in some cases, citizen enforcement litigation pro-
vides the only practicable and effective statutory implementation).
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cal and oil spills at the terminal itself, noted the dangers in the
industry's cutbacks on service personnel and safety officers,
protested the companies' decision (acquiesced in by the Coast
Guard) not to have oil spill response stations located at the
entry to Prince William Sound, insufficient radar systems, and
so on. Their clandestine information system within the industry
revealed safety violations and equipment failures in the pipeline
and the terminal which were communicated to government
regulators, the media, and public education audiences in an
attempt to hold the industry to the standards to which it had
agreed.
The wreck of the Exxon Valdez made the truth painfully
evident. The "official" participants in the public and corporate
bureaucracies were grossly inattentive to the real dangers, had
generally ignored the fishermen's criticisms of Alaska, and had
no credible response plan to handle the disaster when it oc-
curred.1"' Within twenty-four hours, Exxon had to take over
command of the response operation, but Exxon had never been
trained to do so; the Coast Guard and the oil companies had
trusted everything to Alyeska, as had the state of Alaska."2
For almost two days, the oil could have been caught if the
official players had been prepared. In an unusual lull, for forty
hours after the spill the air was calm, the oil just floated there
in a vaporous pool around the stricken ship. But the chance
was lost, as the strong seasonal winds began to blow westward
with a vengeance.
At that point, after watching in abject disbelief as nothing
had happened, the fishermen forced themselves into the matter.
They went into a meeting of the official players-the Exxon
Corporation, Alaska, the Coast Guard, the Alaska DEC-and
found that the official industry-government emergency response
center still did not know exactly what it would do. Spread out
101. Alyeska's barge, promised always to be on station to service the skimming
operations was damaged and unloaded, and there were insufficient personnel who
knew how to operate the equipment. OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 17.
102. To supervise and police all operations at the Valdez terminal, including water
and air pollution, loading, pipeline storage, integrity of the tank storage facility, and
other duties, the state of Alaska's department of environmental conservation had
deployed exactly one-half of one full-time field person. The DEC field staff at Valdez
has since been augmented.
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on the table were charts of Prince William Sound, surrounded
by worried officials. When the fishermen entered they were
initially greeted with the questions "Who are you? What are
you doing here? This is an official meeting." "Given the wind
and the currents now, where are you going to target your re-
sponse?" asked the fishermen, ignoring the cold welcome. It
rapidly became clear that the officials did not have a strategy
for prioritizing the response efforts. The people around the table
did not even seem to know which way the currents flowed in
Prince William Sound. So the fishermen-the uninvited, unoffi-
cial participants in the meeting-rolled up their sleeves, chart-
ed where the oil was likely to go, and identified the fish hatch-
eries, the rookeries and spawning areas, the seal pupping
grounds, the most valuable vulnerable places for which protec-
tion should be attempted in an initial triage of available efforts.
"Forget Knight Island, it is too late. Focus on Main Line Bay,
Sawmill Bay, Esther Island.. . ." When the government and
corporate officials confessed that they did not have the boats
required by their emergency plans for deploying diversion
booms at priority sites, the fishermen went to their radio-tele-
phones. Starting at eight the next morning it was a flotilla of
private fishing boats that began to transport and lay booms at
the most threatened areas, doing the official players' work.
The lesson of this narrative seems quite clear: Who really
knew and was concerned about the practical circumstances and
dangers of the oil transport systems? Who knew best how to
respond when disaster occurred? It was those who lived and
worked nearest to the oil transport system, and who were most
threatened by it. And by the same token, before and after the
wreck, it was those same citizens who tended to be shut out of
the official decision-making process. As the state investigation
found, the official players had allowed themselves to be sub-
orned by complacency and the huge profits to be made and had
excluded the only voices that realistically could apprise them of
what actually was going on in the field.
Out of the Alaska story came a legal innovation that might
well be considered in the Chesapeake Bay watershed and else-
where. First, by a negotiated contract with Alaska, then by
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state law, then by the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990,0
several citizen oversight councils were instituted, comprised of
citizens who would be actually affected by violations of the stat-
utes and the serious environmental consequences that could
follow.' These councils have been given their own budgets,
permanent staff, and investigatory powers, so that the smug
insulation of the official inside players could never again escape
the active engagement of officially recognized citizen watchdogs.
This phenomenon of citizen involvement echoes a long history
of citizen enforcement of major federal environmental laws.
Modelled after provisions in the civil rights acts, Congress put
citizen enforcement provisions into the major pollution stat-
utes-more than twenty of them to date° 5-- and the life of
those statutes and others litigated under the APA has subse-
quently been shaped by citizen litigation. For instance, how
many enforcement actions have been brought against federal
agencies by Congress, the President, or the Department of Jus-
tice for violations of the National Environmental Policy Act?
The answer is obvious: virtually zero. The hundreds of law
suits which have made NEPA a significant environmental pro-
103. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761 (1986 West & Supp. 1995).
104. The Citizen Oversight Council on Oil and Hazardous Substances, ALASKA
STAT. § 24.20.600 (1992), provided for a citizens' oversight council with the duty to
investigate and report findings; it was invested with subpoena powers to carry out its
assigned mandate, and undertook a number of useful analytical investigations before
it was repealed at the instance of a large polluter. The "regional citizen advisory
councils" (RCACs) now functioning under federal OPA-'90 authority have fared some-
what better, with one successfully established in Prince William Sound, and one in
Cook Inlet, although industry and bureaucratic pressures have blunted some of the
councils' initiatives. (The evolution and elements of this novel experiment deserve an
extended case study.)
105. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 19(d), 20(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d),
§ 2619 (1988); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)
(1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d)
(1988); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c) (1988);
Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972) § 505(d),
33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1988); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (1988);
Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1988); Noise Control Act of
1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1988); Energy Sources Development Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851(e)(2) (1988); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (1988);
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7604, 7607(f) (1988); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d)
(1988); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d) (1988); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (1988).
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tection statute (if not a panacea) have been brought by private
citizens. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act have been
shaped by strategic litigation from the very beginning. Citizen
lawsuits were necessary to establish nondeterioration terms so
that the acts could not be interpreted to allow the spread of
pollution into unpolluted areas, to require statutory deadlines to
be met, and to ensure that enforcement efforts would be seri-
ously administered. Many of us who have worked with citizen
groups have on occasion been asked by a federal official,
"Please tell me you will sue me if I don't do what the law re-
quires, so that I can go to my superiors and tell them that we
must enforce the law."
What does this fact of the catalytic role of citizens reveal? I
would argue that it shows that bureaucratic regulators have
never been and can never be a sufficient public counterweight
to the industrial marketplace's inclination and power. As in the
Gulf of Alaska, you need people who are actually being impact-
ed by problems to push the process to do what it was set up to
do. In Lon Fuller's terms, the bipolar system-regulators bal-
ancing regulated entities in the economy-has always been too
narrow a basis for rational societal governance. Instead govern-
mental rationality requires "multipolarity"-including govern-
ment, industry, and a variety of citizen outsiders who, uniquely
in the American system, have been able to enter in and play a
gadfly role.1"'
Environmental law, then, has been formed by civically-driven
citizen litigation-not like private litigation as it had been
known before, with individuals defending their own private
interests, applying public laws along with the common law to
reinforce their private claims. In most citizen environmental
litigation based on federal statutes, plaintiffs, in effect, take on
a major tactical portion of the job of enforcing societal laws. It
is a very American phenomenon, only recently being picked up
106. In the fisheries setting, for example, in the absence of an aroused citizenry
and media reaction, the political power clearly lies with the industry, not the regula-
tors. The only way the log jam could be broken was by citizen litigation. In 1991 the
Conservation Law Foundation's suit was the only reason the council and the Depart-
ment of Commerce began to proceed toward renewed enforcement of a quota system
(and by the time it was implemented, three years later, it was too late.) Conservation
Law Found. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1993).
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in other legal systems, primarily in Europe. It emphasizes that
law enforcement is not a cynical insider game, and that citizens
will be part of the legal system, which gives environmental
regulation the added credibility of consumer enforcement.
IV. THE NEW UNLEARNING: COUNTER-REVOLUTION,
CONSOLIDATION, AND THE FUTURE
Suddenly, over the past year, the momentum of environmen-
tal policy-making in Washington has been changing. Especially
in the south wing of the Capitol building there are dramatic
calls to cut back on law in general, and environmental law in
particular. The attacks target the common law which has been
so important for the development of environmental law, citizen
litigation and law enforcement generally, and most dramatically
in recent months an assault upon the fundamental idea of fed-
eral governmental regulation of environmental quality."7
It is probably inappropriate to label the current political
climate a "backlash," which implies a broad societal rejection of
what has been accomplished. Despite justified criticisms of
particular features of some programs, there appears to be con-
tinuing wide popular support for the different values and pro-
grams that have been built up in the field we call environmen-
tal law. Rather it seems more like a counter-revolution, an
opportunistic initiative to challenge and overturn basic princi-
ples developed over the years, on behalf of a particular agenda.
That agenda appears to be built of the same people and the
same forces that drive the engine we have observed, that re-
quired civic regulation in the first place and that have resisted
it so strenuously.
One battlefield is the common law. Building upon numerous
anecdotes of torts law excesses, an initiative has long been
building to cut back on plaintiffs' access to judicial remedies.
107. It has been the federal government that has long been the primary locus of
American environmental law, in part because of the logical necessity of having uni-
form federal minimum baseline standards for pollution. Federal floors are necessary
to avoid the invidious inter-state competition of the "race of laxity," replaying the
tragedy of the commons in the federal setting. See NLS, supra note 1, at 726-27,
776-79.
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Current manifestations in the federal House of Representatives,
including bills filed by Representative Hyde, would cut back
substantially on the ability of plaintiffs to certify class actions,
to maintain product liability litigation, and to seek damages be-
yond straight compensation; the "loser-pays" proposal would
likewise mean a chilling of litigation by low-income and public
interest plaintiffs, for whom the assertion of legal rights would
become a high-stakes gamble. °8 These restraints on plaintiffs
are targeted far beyond the reform of excesses. They restrict
the adjudicability of many externalized costs that over the
years have only found practical remedy in the courts.
What would these changes mean for latter-day Kepone cases?
Remember that, because of practical problems in applying other
theories of Virginia common law, the workers in the LSP plant
who successfully sued and settled with Allied in this case pro-
ceeded predominantly on products liability theories. It is there-
fore possible that the most egregious injury imposed by the
Kepone incident would be substantially more difficult or impos-
sible to litigate under the bills filed by Representative Hyde,
leaving workers to the scant mercies of the workers' compensa-
tion acts, which don't pretend to compensate for nondisabling
neurological injuries and loss of quality of life, not to mention
reproductive disorders. °9
The current assaults on the common law were earlier fore-
shadowed by attempts to undercut citizen enforcement litiga-
tion. In the field of statutory enforcement litigation, beginning
during the Nixon Court, there have been ongoing efforts to cut
back on the access of citizen enforcers to the federal courts and
to circumscribe the terms of legislative enactments, reducing
them to exercises in form rather than substance."0 In the
108. H.R. 1075, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
109. The quelling of common law is not only a feature of the federal political
scene. In Alaska, for example, a recent statute, passed at the instance of a large
polluter, provides that private nuisance actions cannot be brought against industrial
polluters that are in compliance with a permit, a move that uses state-wide minimum
standards to preempt plaintiffs from applying the traditional location-specific
protections of common law. (If plaintiffs challenge this as a regulatory taking, the act
provides that the benefited industry shall undertake and pay for the state's defense,
and pay any compensation assessed.) ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1994).
110. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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field of water pollution, as it would apply in a latter-day
Kepone case, although affected citizens of the James River
watershed and Chesapeake Bay probably would not be excluded
from standing to enforce the Clean Water Act by the terms of
Justice Scalia's restrictive Lujan 11 decision,"' their role
would be circumscribed by the Court's Gwaltney decision"
which seems to give corporate polluters one free bite at the
apple and makes citizen enforcement a less credible deterrent
to industrial decisions to pollute.
Note that environmental law has not by any means been a
symphony of pro environmental legal milestones over the past
twenty-five years. Viewing the case reports, I would judge that
environmentalists continue to lose more cases than they win,
and in modern environmental litigation, the government is as
often defending pro-industry positions as defending its protec-
tive measures against industry plaintiffs. There has been a
traditional give and take between the voices for environmental
protection and the voices for greater tolerance of pollution.
There has, of course, long existed an earnest institutional
effort to resist and turn back environmental protections, coming
from those who are forced to internalize costs previously passed
wide to the commons. Over the past several years, however, the
rhetoric and political counterforces against regulation have
crescendoed. The visible front line of that effort until late 1994
was the so-called Wise Users. They, and subsequently their
congressional anti-regulatory allies, present anecdotes of ordi-
nary citizens-small time ranchers, logging families, small busi-
nesses-all hurt by "Kafkaesque" regulations. They call, howev-
er, not for targeted relief for small operators, but for broad
corporate deregulation.
Who provides the impetus, money, and media access for this
assault against environmental regulation? Like a number of the
latter-day "public interest law firms,""' the "populist" anti-
regulatory groups and their talk show rhetoric turn out to be
111. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
112. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
113. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984) (noting
how the Pacific Legal Foundation and its progeny consistently operate as tax deduct-
ible fronts for anti-governmental industry positions).
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well-financed fronts for the industries whose externalities in-
duced regulation in the first place. It's the people exploiting our
public lands in the grazing industry and the timber industry,
western water interests who receive federally subsidized water
from porkbarrel projects at a price lower than we pay for water
in Richmond or Boston, or those rugged individuals from the
mining industry who are given their raw materials free from
the public domain."4 The anti-regulatory legislative initiatives,
in other words, do not reflect an agenda of good government
and regulatory reform, but an agenda for elimination of the
public values and public protections that take account of
externalities.'15
Under various pieces of proposed legislation, the current
congressional tide could become a regressive capitulation that
jeopardizes our long term future.
Consider, for instance, the four major generic anti-regulatory
initiatives in the current Congress-the regulatory moratorium;
unfunded mandates; mandatory regulatory risk-assessment/cost
benefit analysis; and the property rights compensation bill,
requiring government to buy its right to regulate.
A. The Regulatory Moratorium
The regulatory moratorium passed in the House on March 6,
1995.11 What is one to make of a moratorium bill that at one
stroke eliminates virtually all federal regulations passed since
November and extends indefinitely into the future? To be fair,
it should be admitted that there is something in all of us that
resents regulation. We all have a little within us of the frontier
fantasy of rugged individualism living on the edge of wilder-
ness. But in conservative terms, in the sense of the precaution-
114. For example, People for the West and its parent organization the Western
States Public Lands Coalition are reported to receive 96% of their finances from in-
dustry donors including Kennecott Copper Co., Chevron, Hecla Mining, Pegasus Gold
Corp., Crown Resources, Great Western Chemical, Garber Land & Livestock, Pfizer,
Inc., Montana Talc Co., Homestake Mining, and more than 30 others. MONTANA
STATE AFL-CIO, FACT SHEET (Annual Convention, June 1993).
115. While targeting government regulations, the initiatives do not question govern-
ment subsidies.
116. H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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ary principle, it is simply astounding that the federal legisla-
ture could propose to wipe out a vast amount of sub-delegated
adjectival lawmaking-authorized by statutes over the last fifty
years and processed through elaborate procedures established
under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Constitu-
tion-with so little intellection. This is not "conservative," it is
more like a corporate putsch.
As an example of the effect of the moratorium on issues we
have discussed, it apparently would prevent renewal of the
emergency fisheries quota regulations, which will expire under
the Magnuson Act"7 in June of this year, and prohibit further
regulation thereafter. This would leave the resource in a regula-
tory position that would require citizens, scientists, and officials
to watch as desperate fishing boat skippers sail off to destroy
the Banks' remaining spawning stock and juvenile fish."'
The legislative process applied to the moratorium bill and its
siblings shows indications of an intemperance that is far from
conservative. Regulations were subjected to blanket suspension,
subject only to generic exceptions for emergency and "routine"
regulations, both of which will require agonizing judicial inter-
pretation." Among the precautionary indications is that ap-
parently no one in the House has even attempted to prepare a
list of what regulations were being suspended. No analysis
introduced in the House floor debate even cataloged the names
of regulations passed since November or currently pending in
agency processes. The House majority would suspend these
rules without even knowing what they are.
A further indicator, particularly distressing to students and
teachers of governmental process, is that for the moratorium
bill and a number of the other bills in the avalanche agenda,
117. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 18d (1994).
118. During the debate, Representative Young of Alaska asserted that Alaskan
fisheries regulations would not be affected because they were "routine," an argument
that at the least would not apply to Atlantic fisheries rules, unless the word routine
was defined so broadly as to make most environmental rules routine. 141 CONG. REC.
H2087, H2088 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995). The courts are likely to be filled for years
with the scattered definitional fallout of these bills.
119. H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). As another indication of the erratic
legislative process, note the only specific exemption from the moratorium bill in the
House, passed on February 22: the House majority allowed the duck and goose hunt-
ing season to take effect.
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there have been neither legislative hearings (unless one counts
Mr. Limbaugh's talk radio), "Pombo-ed" hearings, or truncated
superficial hearings. 2 ' The Article I legislative process as we
have known it over the last 100-plus years has been substan-
tially bypassed. Industry lobbyists have openly been given the
role not only of authoring legislative language, but also of sup-
plying the congressional arguments and committee defenses for
their antienvironmental bills.12" ' The testimony of informed
public interest analysts has been ignored. As with the corpo-
rate-populist rhetoric that accompanied its Contract, the failure
of the congressional process to consider social costs has made it
not only anti-intellectual, but anti-intellect.
The terms of the Contract with America implicitly treat envi-
ronmental law and the bipartisan statutory initiatives that
have shaped it over the last twenty-five years as a rhetorical
enemy, in terms that were undoubtedly originally intended as
political epigrams rather than as prescriptions for actual legis-
lation. To the drafters' and our mutual surprise, the bromides
120. The hearings held around the nation on Endangered Species Act
reauthorization by the task force headed by ex-rancher Rep. Richard Pombo (R-Cal.)
broke new legislative process ground in their orchestrated tumult and exclusion of
pro-environmental witnesses. As noted in a newspaper review of the hearings, House
Resources Committee chair Don Young, "a former riverboat captain who believes ef-
forts to study the nation's flora and fauna systematically are part of a 'socialist agen-
da,'" wasted no time in going after the endangered Species Act when Congress con-
vened and bypassed a subcommittee chairman who supports the law. Pombo had a
"clear mission" as he led his task force across the South and West:
find people who have been hurt by the ESA . . . and let them talk....
At one hearing in California, the crowds got so ornery that they booed
elementary schoolchildren who spoke in support of the act .... A Re-
publican member of the panel.., said a hearing in his state was
scratched because he had invited one of the world leading authorities on
extinctions, Harvard biologist E.O. Wilson . . . to speak ....
The hearings scheduled for rural areas such as Boerne, Texas, and
Belle Chasse, Louisiana, were quickly engulfed in controversy as envi-
ronmentalists accused Pombo of deliberately avoiding regions . . . where
support for the law is stronger. Others said task force members inten-
tionally used inflammatory language at the hearings to incite the crowd.
Pombo rejected these assertions .. . [calling] the field hearings
'the most comprehensive congressional investigation and review that has
ever been undertaken of the Endangered Species Act.'
Scott Allen, Speaking in Wildlife's Behalf Gingrich Intervenes in Debate Over Endan-
gered Species, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1995, at 1.
121. See Stephen Engelberg, Conflict of Interest is Cited in Regulatory Bill Lobby-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at 23.
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became blueprints for fast moving legislation, particularly on
the House side.
Notable in the legislative agenda is the so-called "Unholy
Trinity," the bills that have targeted unfunded federal man-
dates, required regulatory risk assessment cost benefit analysis,
and required compensation for regulations that diminish proper-
ty values.
B. Unfunded Mandates
The unfunded mandates proposals, one of which has passed
the House, 2 could, in a latter-day Kepone situation, have
raised substantial questions about the federal government's "co-
operative federalism" strategy of making state agencies, rather
than federal enforcement officials, the primary instruments for
applying environmental quality standards. Pursuant to the Con-
tract with America, unfunded mandates bills submitted in the
104th Congress included a proposed constitutional amendment
and a substantive prohibition against federal regulatory require-
ments of states not accompanied by federal reimbursements.
Under the terms of these bills, presumably the federal govern-
ment would have had to pay Virginia for state government's
expenses enforcing health and safety regulations within the
Commonwealth of Virginia, a dramatic shift that would under-
mine the state-based approach of the Clean Air Act, for exam-
ple, which at the insistence of the states has relied upon State
Implementation Plans. The bill ultimately signed by President
Clinton last March,' however, has installed what is essen-
tially a new set of internal congressional procedural steps to
provide for points of order that can be overridden by a simple
majority to allow such requirements of states and local govern-
ments to proceed. Absent the flat prohibition of unfunded man-
dates, the question now will be how much additional momen-
tum will be required to get past the new procedural require-
ment in order to pass or reauthorize federal statutes.
122. See, e.g., H.R. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
123. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
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C. Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis
As to risk assessment and cost benefit analysis, there is of
course a fundamental rationality and logic about assessing risks
and analyzing benefits and costs before policies and actions are
implemented. In the realities of a modern governing system,
however, this process cannot be a simple exercise in digital
calculations. Even some economists who specialize in risk as-
sessment theory and benefit-cost analysis (who surely incline
otherwise) conclude that it is naive to think that they or any-
one can make risk assessment and benefit cost calculations that
would determine where to peg particular public health and
environmental standards, or whether to pass or reject a particu-
lar regulation."
Risk assessment and benefit cost analysis are important
parts of the policy debate, but are not instrumental calcula-
tions. The bill proceeding in Congress, however," purports to
require such a positive calculation, or regulation cannot go for-
ward. In light of the context, it appears likely that the intent of
the risk assessment benefit cost analysis legislation is not to
achieve a more subtle regulation but rather, as many observers
have noted, to achieve regulatory "paralysis by analysis.""6
In the Kepone example, for instance, we never developed
data on the off-site poisoning effects of Kepone nor attempted
any quantification of those effects, much less a comprehensive
quantification of the commercial fisheries and sport fisheries
losses in the economic system of the Chesapeake Bay.. Nor have
we attempted a quantification of the natural resources losses
that residual Kepone poisoning in the waters and sediments
would cause. It is probable, given the multiplier effects of eco-
124. See Paul Portney, Chain-saw Surgery: The Killer Clauses Inside the 'Contract',
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1995 at C3 and the generally skeptical articles in Symposium,
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251 (1995). For a
collection of essays critically analyzing the EPA's cost-benefit regulatory proposals,
presented at the 1992 Annapolis conference sponsored by the resource economics insti-
tute Resources for the Future, see WORST THINGS FIRST (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic
Golding eds., 1994).
125. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Title III of H.R. 9 is entitled "Risk
Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis for New Regulations").
126. See Peter A.A. Berle, Safeguarding Environmental Protection, AUDUBON May-
June 1994, at 6.
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nomic injuries that the number would be large indeed, but a
regulation shutting down the Chesapeake Bay, especially absent
data on what kinds of health affects can be expected at differ-
ent degrees of contamination of seafood when eaten by humans,
would mean, under the terms of the bill as originally drafted at
least, that the government would bear a substantial burden of
time and effort before it could act to protect consumers against
contaminated food.
D. Property Rights Compensation
As to property rights compensation, there are a number of
different forms of this legislation in the legislative process."
It is not clear what the effect of a regulatory compensation
statute would be in the Kepone setting, but in the fisheries
example its wildly dysfunctional potential effect can be seen. If,
for example, a serious quota regulation or moratorium were
imposed on the trawlers' catch at a point before the market
forces had completely destroyed commercial fishing, the market
value of fishing boats in some cases would clearly diminish by
ten percent, twenty percent or more. Under some of the current
bills, this would require the federal government to buy out
boatowners or to compensate them for the market value dimi-
nution to their boats, if it wished to save the fisheries resource
for the nation (and for the industry).
This changes the fundamental nature of government; for the
first time in history it must pay to govern and to protect. From
a sovereign public trustee, government becomes an involuntary
market player, forced to act as a brokerage house in the sky,
monetizing the benefits of public regulation" and paying
them out to compensate those burdened by regulation or by
ceasing to regulate (which presumably is the proponents' real
agenda).
And there are other bills in the opportunistic tide, seizing
upon the giddy ascendancy of corporate populism. The so-called
127. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Title IX of H.R. 9, which is entitled
"Private Property Rights Protection and Compensation," is the vehicle that passed the
House and awaits Senate action at the time of this writing.
128. Presumably by new and imaginative forms of taxation.
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"Timber Salvage Act" 9 would create a clearcutting jamboree
in our last remaining old growth federal forests; the private
timber companies wrote a bill requiring the Forest Service to
subsidize their clearcutting of more than six billion board feet
without complying with environmental laws.
Facing these contemporary legislative assaults, in light of
what we have learned in the years since the Kepone debacle,
one can at most hazard some general predictions:
- The near future: Whatever is likely to transpire legislative-
ly in the near future is likely to have effects; it is likely to be
fairly visible what is done, by whom, on behalf of whom, with
what consequences, and that will then become grist in the polit-
ical process, with an opportunity for majoritarian opinion to
respond. In ten years time even peremptory radical actions will
be tempered by history, and systems will have adjusted.
o The basics: If the fundamental perceptions of Coase and
Carson were right (and they both seem to have a handle on a
basic truth), then actuality will catch up with politics and be
evident. If acid precipitation continues to fall, if clearcut moun-
tainsides erode, if climate conditions continue to react to human
impositions, then the market-based attack on regulation will be
proved wrong, even a disaster.
- America: The basic question is how much will be lost in a
paroxysm of short term profiteering. This is not a promising
national agenda for carrying us into the twenty-first century.
Environmentalism is not only aimed at long term survival con-
cerns, but also on our sustainable development as a great soci-
ety, and our society's long term stature may now be at risk.
129. The Timber Salvage Act was ultimately inserted into Title II, § 2001 of the
omnibus "rescissions" bill. H.R. 1158, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) Vice President
Gore strenuously argued that the bill was designed to raid public lands on behalf of
loggers; it was vetoed on June 7, 1995. The text of the provision, which reappeared
in the "compromise" version being pressed on the President as they go to press, not
only allows for a very broad definition of "threatened" timber to be cut for the preser-
vation of the forest overriding all environmental statutory safeguards, but also man-
dates that the U.S. Forest Service and BLM increase the cut given to loggers from
public lands. The agencies would have to offer the timber companies 6.2 billion board
feet of timber over two years, approximately doubling the current yearly yield from
the national forest system. Tom Kenworthy & Dan Morgan, Panel Would Allow Mas-
sive Logging on Federal Land, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1995, at Al.
[Vol. 29:657712
FACING A TIME OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION
- Resilience: There is enormous resilience in humans and in
natural systems; some things may be destroyed forever, but a
new evolving balance will emerge. We may be poorer for the
losses, but absent nuclear holocaust or a supervirus, humans
will continue to be a dominant part of the mix.
• Law: For the foreseeable future, human nature is not going
to be repealed, so there will remain a need for regulatory law.
. Civic instincts: Aristotle said that man is a political ani-
mal, 30 emphasizing the civic nature that characterizes human
societies. These instincts toward community mean that we have
some responsibility to others, and to future generations, as well
as to the individual selfinterests that so powerfully drive our
economic life.
* Interconnectedness: Things natural and human will contin-
ue to be interconnected, and actions will have consequences. We
will not be able to separate ourselves from one another or from
the consequences of our actions. We're all in this together.
V. SUMMARY
The Kepone saga revealed an inherent tendency in economic
enterprises to pass-on pollution costs to the public, a tendency
that makes regulation both necessary and embattled. The dra-
matic growth of environmental science, policy, and law over the
past quarter century has forever changed what we know about
the consequences of human externalization of costs into the
environment, and about how we can respond to them. As the
market forces that necessitated regulation now agitate strident-
ly for its rescission, it is still clear that human nature has not
been repealed; the lessons of science, law, and policy cannot be
unlearned, and therefore environmental law inevitably will
remain a challenging, indispensable necessity for our sustain-
able future.
130. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 60 (Trevor J. Saunders ed. & TA. Sinclair Trans.,
Penguin Books 1981).
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